Social Media, Content Moderation & Int'l Human Rights Law : simplebooklet.com

rights law does not prohibit misinformation or disinformation In fact the in a conflict setting It then explores the platform law of four of the leading right to freedom of expression includes the right to impart information and platforms in use in the region during the conflict VK VKontakte a Russian ideas 7 irrespective of the truth or falsehood of the content 8 including when online social media and networking service Twitter Instagram and Facebook transmitted via the Internet thereby providing protections for the expression and examines how those policies align with international human rights law of misinformation and disinformation The second part of the report consists of four case studies of content posted 9 Restriction of any expression including hate speech is only permissible under international human rights law if it meets the tripartite test found in Article 19 3 ICCPR provided by law for a legitimate purpose and both necessary and proportionate 10 The UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression Irene Kahn asserts that In the light of the fundamental importance of this right to the enjoyment of all other human rights the restrictions must be exceptional and narrowly construed 11 Given the strong protections afforded to expression under international human rights law moderating online content is a difficult task Just because content may shock offend or disturb 12 from the perspective of one set of users does not mean that it can or should be restricted or removed unless it amounts to hate speech or propaganda for war The same goes for content that is false or misleading 13 In response to the increasing challenges of moderating content social media companies have adopted content moderation guidelines platform law 14 in attempts to protect free speech regulate user generated content and prescribe platform responses to content falling outside of their rules The result is a confusing patchwork of platform law across social media companies which is opaque and difficult to apply Whatever the state of individual social media companies platform law there is no doubt that reviewing the amount of content posted online is a formidable task Many major social media companies have thus turned to automation technologies to supplement efforts to flag and filter objectionable and illegal content on their platforms 15 which is often problematic 16 The first part of this report outlines the pertinent international human rights law protections and prohibitions that apply to online content particularly 12 by Armenian and Azerbaijani users to those four platforms during the conflict identified through open source investigation OSINT research that appear to violate platform law but which were not subject to any content moderation We evaluate whether the identified content could or should have been moderated by the social media company it was posted to in accordance with the relevant platform law and international human rights law We find platforms failing to moderate hate speech which is prohibited under international human rights law and should be criminalized under domestic law We also find that where the hate speech threshold is not met freedom of expression often means that content does not warrant moderation under current platform law and international human rights law even when it may be false or misleading or undesirable or distasteful to certain users There may be policy reasons to moderate this type of content particularly during an armed conflict where expression online may influence conflict dynamics on the ground In some instances where content is particularly egregious or manipulated and where moderation is permitted under the rules social media companies do not always act as prescribed by their platform law In addition when content moderation is permitted under platform law platform law is often not precise enough to enable a restriction of expression in accordance with international human rights law The final part of the report provides some specific recommendations for social media companies to make their internal self regulatory policies and content moderation practices more transparent to users both content creators and content consumers and better align with international human rights law These recommendations are intended to be a starting point for deeper discussion on the challenges posed by proliferating harmful content online particularly during an armed conflict 13

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THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW FRAMEWORK AND PLATFORM LAW Social media companies have become central fora for information discussion and debate both during times of conflict and of peace Since the UN Human Rights Council s adoption of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights UNGPs in 2011 17 businesses including social media companies 18 have increasingly come to be recognized as having a responsibility to respect human rights 19 According to a July 2020 report from the UN Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations in a situation of armed conflict companies not only owe a responsibility to respect human rights in general but they also come under a heightened responsibility because their business operations may influence conflict dynamics irrespective of whether the company takes a side in the conflict 20 The Working Group specifically names and shames the tech sector highlighting that misinformation and hate speech on Facebook fueled the Rohingya genocide in Myanmar and social media companies should be on notice of this heightened responsibility 21 A REGULATING EXPRESSION UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW International human rights law provides a framework of standards that social media companies should seek to uphold on their platforms and in content moderation decision making 22 Article 19 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights ICCPR protects freedom of opinion and expression including the right to impart information and ideas even if such information is 23 1 states that a ny propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law 27 The travaux pr paratoires of Article 20 1 articulate two distinct elements to propaganda for war 28 The first element concerns incitement to war which the UN General Assembly has interpreted narrowly as a call for conflict or an act of aggression 29 The second element concerns the repeated and insistent expression of an opinion for the purpose of creating a climate of hatred and lack of understanding between the peoples of two or more countries in order to bring them eventually to armed conflict 30 The second paragraph of Article 20 is commonly referred to as the hate speech provision 31 and provides that a ny advocacy of national racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law 32 The UN Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech has defined hate speech as any kind of communication in speech writing or behaviour that attacks or uses pejorative or discriminatory language with reference to a person or a group on the basis of who they are in other words based on their religion ethnicity nationality race colour descent gender or other identity factor 33 The Rabat Plan of Action adopted by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in 2012 sets out a six part multi factor test for assessing hate speech and in turn the necessity of adopting measures against such speech including 1 context of the speech 2 the speaker 3 whether there is intent to incite 4 the content and form of the speech 5 the extent of the speech act and 6 the likelihood including imminence of harm that would result from the speech 34 The Human Rights Committee has highlighted that even when expression falls into the categories of propaganda for war or hate speech it may only be restricted in accordance with the cumulative tripartite test in Article 19 3 35 incorrect 24 This includes information transmitted via the Internet 25 Restrictions International human rights law does not prohibit misinformation and on expression are permissible under a rigorous cumulative three part test disinformation Although a lot of the discourse around social media company enshrined in Article 19 3 ICCPR moderation efforts is focused on this type of online content 36 no general 26 14 Article 20 ICCPR prohibits propaganda for war and hate speech Its paragraph The test first requires that the restriction be provided by law The second element requires that the restriction pursue consensus has been reached on the definition of these terms which makes either a the legitimate ground of respecting the rights or reputations of others it difficult to address 37 Whatever the precise content of the terms Article or b of protecting national order public order or public health or morals The 19 2 protects freedom of expression even if the expression is false 38 and so third element requires that the restriction be necessary and proportionate misinformation and disinformation are broadly protected under international 15

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Freedom of expression is not part of the problem it is the primary means for fighting disinformation human rights law Irene Khan 1 VK VKontakte recognizes that disinformation VK strives to achieve a balance between freedom of expression and user is a challenge to freedom of safety in accordance with the requirements of Russian legislation 43 VK states expression but she asserts that transparency and convenient information distribution are at the core that attempts to combat of the product 44 Essentially VK aims to strike proportionate responses in disinformation by undermining its content moderation efforts through its Safety Guidelines which chiefly human rights are shortsighted and counterproductive Freedom of address threats of violence and hate speech 45 VK enumerates the types of expression is not part of the problem it is the primary means for content that users should refrain from posting and encourages users to use fighting disinformation as it allows for alternative viewpoints to be the Report button VK claims that they address every report often within presented and falsehoods and conspiracy theories to be challenged 39 several minutes and usually within an hour and If they block a profile or B MODERATING CONTENT UNDER PLATFORM LAW to human review VK constantly monitors the platform for any harmful content All social media platforms regulate user generated content under being uploaded via automatic search tools digital fingerprint technology and their own content moderation policies many of which claim to protect neural networks 47 Rule 7 2 2 of the VK Terms of Service provides that VK may freedom of expression while maintaining a safe space for users 40 Most delete or remove without giving advanced notice any Content or Users at is of these policies can be found in the companies Terms of Service or own discretion which infringes these Terms Russian legislation and or may designated rules but some are scattered elsewhere This is especially infringe the rights of cause damage to or threaten the security of other Users true for Facebook and Instagram policies an issue that has been or third parties 48 raised by the Facebook Oversight Board and which should promptly be addressed 41 2 Twitter Twitter states that it develops policy considering global perspectives around In this section we provide a brief overview of relevant policies of some the changing nature of online speech including how their rules are applied of the most popular social media platforms that were in use in the and interpreted in different cultural and social contexts 49 With its emphasis region VK Twitter Facebook and Instagram both during the period on context in its development and enforcement philosophy 50 Twitter aims to of the conflict September to November 2020 where available and at abide by what it refers to as the Twitter Rules 51 Twitter s first set of rules the time of research in August 2021 are about protecting users safety 52 For instance the Violent threats 53 42 16 community based on a report they notify the user who filed it 46 In addition What we see is that while all platforms have developed rules governing the type of content permitted Glorification of violence 54 and Abusive behavior 55 policies aim to promote on their sites some platform law is more transparent and detailed than a healthy dialogue among users by proscribing inter alia the incitement of others Each platform has a range of moderation mechanisms at its violence and calls for serious harm against a group of people Twitter also has disposal from labeling to takedowns but it is not always clear in which a Hateful conduct policy that claims to prohibit the promotion of violence circumstance an enforcement mechanism will be applied threats or harrassment on the basis of race ethnicity national origin caste 17

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sexual orientation gender gender identity religious affiliation age disability respect framework outlined in the UNGPs specifically by 1 applying human or serious disease rights policies 2 conducting human rights due diligence and disclosure 56 Twitter s Sensitive media policy claims to prohibit media that is excessively gory or share violent or adult content within live 3 providing access to remedy 4 maintaining oversight governance and video or in profile of header images accountability and 5 protecting human rights defenders 67 With respect 57 Twitter also has a set of rules on authenticity 58 Its policies on Platform manipulation and spam 59 Impersonation 60 and Synthetic and manipulated media 61 are all aimed at prohibiting users from deceiving others whether that Standards which govern what user generated content is or is not allowed on the platform 68 be through coordinated inauthentic behavior the impersonation of someone Facebook has six sections to its Community Standards 69 There are multiple else or the dissemination of significantly altered media policies articulated in each Community Standards section each begins with Twitter s enforcement philosophy is grounded in freedom of expression and promotes counterspeech 62 Twitter emphasizes that context matters in its enforcement decisions and provides a non exhaustive list of factors the platform may consider including whether the behavior is directed at an individual group or protected category of people the report has been filed by the target of the abuse or a bystander the user has a history of a policy rationale setting out the aims of the policy followed by specific policy lines that outline content that s not allowed and content that requires additional information to enforce on content that is allowed with a warning screen or content that is allowed but can only be viewed by adults aged 18 and older 70 Each policy is quite detailed Here we focus on those that appear most relevant for content posted in a conflict setting violating Twitter s policies the severity of the violation the content may be Under the Violence and Criminal Behavior section Facebook has policies a topic of legitimate public interest on Violence and Incitement 71 Dangerous Individuals and Organizations 72 63 If a post is found to violate Twitter s policies Twitter has a range of enforcement mechanisms in place Tweet and Coordinating Harm and Publicizing Crime 73 which pursue the goal of level enforcement can include labeling a Tweet that may contain disputed preventing offline harm by inter alia prohibiting content that incites or calls or misleading information Limiting Tweet visibility Requiring Tweet for violence similar in scope to the Twitter rules The Dangerous Individuals removal Hiding a violating Tweet while awaiting its removal and Organizations policy is particularly concerned with content that supports 64 Twitter also has account level enforcement policies that may result in Requiring media hate organizations hateful ideologies and hate banned entities delineated into or profile edits Placing an account on read only mode Verifying account three tiers with different types of enforcement 74 Tier 1 includes organizations ownership Permanent suspension 65 At the Tweet level exceptions may be that engage in serious offline harms for which Facebook removes praise made if a Tweet is in the public interest In those instances Twitter places the substantive support and representation as well as their leaders founders Tweet behind a notice explaining the exception and giving users the option or prominent members Tier 2 is geared towards Violent Non State Actors to view the Tweet defined as entities that engage in violence against state or military actors 3 Facebook In its Corporate Human Rights Policy Facebook commits itself to respecting human rights including the rights set out in the ICCPR 66 According to Facebook it implements this commitment by adopting the responsibility to 18 to approach 1 Facebook claims to prioritize human rights in its Community but who do not generally target civilians For this group Facebook claims to remove all substantive support and representation of these entities their leaders and their prominent members as well as praise of the group s violent activities Tier 3 entities are those that may repeatedly violate Facebook s Hate Speech or Dangerous Organizations policies This type of content is not 19

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automatically removed to allow room for users to report on condemn or 4 Instagram neutrally discuss them or their activities but users must clearly indicate their Instagram is owned by Facebook 82 Facebook notes in its Corporate Human intent when creating or sharing such content If this is missing Facebook Rights Policy that human rights principles guide Instagram s Community defaults to removing content The Violence and Incitement policy contains Guidelines which set out Instagram s content moderation rules 83 These a misinformation and imminent harm rule that prohibits misinformation Community Guidelines are relatively thin in comparison to Facebook s policies that contribute s to the risk of imminent violence or physical harm 75 This but this can be explained by the fact that Instagram s Community Guidelines policy requires users do not post a variety of content but it is unclear what incorporate many of Facebook s Community Standards by providing external the enforcement action is if users fail to abide by the policies This policy also links to them 84 It appears that Facebook s policies on Violence and Incitement includes information on content that would require additional information or Dangerous Individuals and Organizations Hate Speech Violent and Graphic context to enforce Content and Account Integrity and Authentic Identity cover Instagram as The section on Objectionable Content contains a policy on Hate Speech that addresses content targeting a group of people based on a shared identity factor 76 It also has a Violent and Graphic Content 77 policy under which Facebook commits to remov ing content that glorifies violence or celebrates the suffering or humiliation of others Facebook also notes that people value the ability to discuss important issues like human rights abuses or acts of terrorism and suggest that a warning label is more appropriate for this type of content than a takedown This section has three tiers of prohibited content and information on content that would require additional information or context to enforce well In addition Instagram has its own policy on Reducing the Spread of False Information 85 aimed at regulating the spread of misinformation and disinformation C MEASURING PLATFORM LAW AGAINST INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW If we map the international human rights law framework onto platform law we see that all four social media companies claim to respect freedom of expression All have detailed rules on hate speech which seem to directly address the type of expression expressly prohibited under Article 20 2 Beyond this social media companies do not generally follow the same nomenclature Under its Safety section Facebook has a policy on Bullying and Harassment of international human rights law in their policies and so there are fewer which distinguishes between private individuals and public figures The provisions that specifically address Article 20 1 prohibited content propaganda former garners more protection and Facebook professes to remove content for war Across platforms we identified no provisions that expressly regulate that is meant to degrade or shame There are seven tiers of content that incitement to war or the repeated and insistent expression of an opinion for is not allowed some of which require self reporting prior to removal and the purpose of creating a climate of hatred and lack of understanding between additional content that would require more information to enforce on the peoples of two or more countries in order to bring them eventually to Like Twitter Facebook additionally has Community Standards in place that armed conflict 86 aim to maintain user integrity and authenticity 78 For instance the Account In a departure from international human rights law which provides explicit Integrity and Authentic Identity 79 False News 80 and Manipulated Media 81 protection for expression irrespective of the truth or falsehood of the policies seek to combat deception As with other policies Facebook lists some content 87 the platforms all have policies on misinformation and disinformation guidance on the type of content that is not allowed and for which Facebook which permits moderation of this type of content How they approach will disable accounts as well as the content for which Facebook would seek moderation of this type of content varies for example Twitter has policies in further information before taking action 20 21

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place that solely target misinformation in the context of COVID 19 electoral of tensions and potential triggers including contextual factors and the real processes or manipulated media whereas Facebook has a policy targeting and perceived grievances that are steering the conflict ii mapping the main misinformation and false news generally Instagram has a policy on false actors in the conflict and their motives capacities and opportunities to inflict news generally and VK has a vague policy refraining users from posting violence and iii identifying and anticipating the ways in which the business s disinformation own operations products or services impact upon existing tensions and Whether any moderation i e restrictions of content under platform law is in line with international human rights law depends on the application of the policy to individual pieces of content and whether any restriction on expression meets the rigorous three part test enshrined in Article 19 3 ICCPR 88 Part one requires that the restriction be provided by law which must be sufficiently precise and publicly accessible 89 When considering content posted to social media the law in question is relevant platform law90 and platform law differs considerably in its precision depending on the policy in question The second element of the Article 19 3 test requires that the restriction pursue either a the legitimate ground of respecting the rights or reputations of others or b of protecting national order public order or public health or morals However platform law does not always make clear the grounds for its moderation policy The third element of Article 19 3 relationships between the various groups and or create new tensions or conflicts 93 While it is possible that this is accounted for in internal policies social media companies should ensure that they are weaving this approach into their moderation decisions and making those policies publicly available so that users can understand how platforms are making decisions It is difficult to comprehend how social media companies apply their various content moderation policies in the abstract It is difficult to comprehend how social media companies apply their various content moderation policies in the abstract The next part of this report looks at some specific pieces of content posted to the platforms during or prior to the conflict in Nagorno Karabakh Artsakh requires that the restriction be necessary and proportionate This is met if 91 the platform law is appropriate to achieve the legitimate ground s pursued and there are no alternative less intrusive enforcement measures available 92 The fact that all four of these social media companies have varied methods of moderating content means that there are a range of measures available for the platforms to draw on if they determine that moderation is necessary under the relevant platform law To accord with Article 19 3 content On September 27 2020 a 44 day armed conflict erupted between Azerbaijan moderation should always pursue the least restrictive means and content and Armenia in Nagorno Karabakh Artsakh 94 The Nagorno Karabakh removal should always be a measure of last resort Republic also known as the Republic of Artsakh is an autonomous state The platform law of these four social media companies does not yet appear to account for the heightened responsibility to protect human rights during conflict The UN Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations outlines three steps that should be taken by businesses in the context of armed conflict i identifying the root causes 22 THE ONLINE INFORMATION WAR DURING THE ARMENIA AZERBAIJAN CONFLICT within Azerbaijan s borders 95 although sovereignty over the territory remains disputed and tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan have been consistently high since the late 1980s 96 Within the first few days of the 2020 conflict tens of thousands of people fled the region Human rights organizations independently verified that civilians civilian objects and infrastructure 97 and medical facilities98 were targeted in violation of international humanitarian law 23

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and international human rights law 99 and unlawful weapons were utilized by both sides 100 There are many reports of Azerbaijan mistreating Armenian prisoners of war 101 On November 9 2020 Russia brokered a Trilateral Agreement leading to a ceasefire 102 This Agreement is not a peace treaty and leaves the status of Nagorno Karabakh Artsakh unresolved Prior to during and after the physical conflict the two sides engaged in an online information war with platform users in both countries using social media companies to fan the flames of the physical conflict A METHODOLOGY We approached our research into the information war by first identifying popular hashtags key words and prominent events dates used by platform users 116 We also identified accounts of key State officials journalists and individuals who were sharing information about the tensions We used these search terms and accounts to conduct research on each of the social media platforms in popular use VK Twitter Facebook and Instagram We used digital verification techniques to confirm details about the posts and account The Azerbaijani government blocked or slowed access to several social media users Through this process our team identified more than 250 pieces of platforms allegedly to prevent large scale Armenian provocations 103 Platform content across the various platforms that raised questions and appeared to users inside Azerbaijan were quick to use VPNs in order to circumvent these violate platform law and could potentially be subject to some form of content restrictions 104 While there is no evidence that Armenia blocked Internet access it moderation but were not subject to moderation by the relevant social media did introduce new censorship measures through amended martial law 105 These company Each piece of content identified was then reviewed by four team measures forbade the publication of criticism of the government and granted members and from this four level review we identified 21 pieces of content that power to the police to levy fines freeze assets and demand content removals from team members believed could potentially be violative of platform law the media 106 In October 2020 alone Facebook removed 589 Azerbaijani accounts and 7 665 pages from Instagram for exhibiting coordinated inauthentic behavior related to the conflict 107 Facebook has not published any numbers on the number of Armenian accounts restricted during this period Several common narratives were advanced across the platforms From Armenian officials and platform users there was a tendency to downplay the Armenian military s role in atrocities 108 It was not uncommon for Armenian officials to project the strength and success of the Armenian military in order to mask the reality that they had suffered major territorial losses 109 according to Freedom House the State s information apparatus misled the Armenian public as to genuine developments in the war both on social media and offline 110 From Azerbaijani platform users there were prevalent false narratives that Armenia is an aggressor 111 engaging civilians child soldiers112 and foreign fighters in the conflict 113 Freedom House reports that the Azerbaijani government limited the public s access to unfavorable news and during the From these 21 examples we have drawn one case study from each of the four platforms that appear to violate platform law 117 These case studies do not reflect the quantity or distribution of posts during the conflict but are indicative of the type of content that was being posted online during the relevant period For example the first case study looks at anti Armenian hate speech While we did find some instances of hate speech and misinformation posted by Armenian users it was outweighed by the overwhelming number of posts of that type from Azerbaijani users We included these particular case studies because either they garnered a minimum level of user engagement the claim in the post spread to other platforms or websites or both We made the decision to exclude content that was particularly graphic inflammatory or offensive but decided nonetheless to include the hate speech example which is all of these things to represent this category of content conflict much of the media landscape was dominated by positive coverage of In the following section we detail our digital verification work on each case the government and specifically the president and then analyze each piece of content under relevant platform law and 114 Both Armenian and Azerbaijani users attempted to advance competing narratives about historical and cultural ties international human rights law standards to determine whether they were or to the region asserting that the opposing side had no historical heritage and would destroy the other s cultural property if given the chance 115 24 25

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of that content dating from July 2020 to March 2021 Most posts and Figure 1 5 is another example of the satirical dead rat post The post was comments that appear on Polygon Azerbaijan s accounts are written in made on December 29 2020 after the end of the Fall conflict 138 This post the Russian and Azerbaijani languages We used Google130 and Yandex131 received 6 700 views 254 likes 19 comments and 14 shares as of September AI translators to translate Russian into English We then verified those translations with a native Russian speaker and adjusted for accuracy and comprehensibility Azerbaijani translations were created using Google and Yandex alone All of the content analyzed below was originally written in Russian An English translation is provided for post content as well as any wording that appears on a posted graphic The post at Figure 1 2 was posted on July 2 2020132 almost two FIGURE 1 2 Translation Category here I come updated Two servicemen of the occupation contingent of the Armenian Armed Forces on the Territory of Azerbaijan were blown up by a mine near their positions in the 7th socalled defensive area military unit 38862 in Tonashen Khoren Anushavanovich Shagulyan conscript soldier lesion and further amputation of the lower limb Levon Hayriyan Khachikovich conscript soldier wounded in the face and neck P S Someone wake up Shushan Shagenovna already otherwise her infernal snoring can already be heard in Barda Hans Kloss Based on mobile application here I come weeks before the July 2020 clashes Kloss constructs the graphics using photos of injured or dead rats available on the Internet and adds images of clothing weapons and other details associated with FIGURE 1 4 This content describes the purported combat deaths of Armenian soldiers during Azerbaijan s military takeover of the city of Fuzuli Objectionable terms are highlighted by colored boxes in the post and are underlined in the English translation Translation Category front line updated At night in the suburb of Fuzuli near the cemetery a unit of 17 baby rats that had fallen behind the escaped occupation contingent of the Armenian Armed Forces was blocked and destroyed Units of the Armenian Armed Forces set a record for running speed in the Zengilan region of Azerbaijan Unfortunately it was not possible to record the exact result of the race of big nosed sprinters because they have not yet been able to catch up Death to the enemy Victory will be ours Hans Kloss Armenian service members Polygon Azerbaijan s mocking post is a response to a report139 that two Armenian service members were killed when their vehicle ran off the Gorus Kapan road The post at Figure 1 6 was posted on March 23 2021 140 more than four months after the end of the Fall conflict It received 5 200 views 131 likes 18 comments and 9 shares as of September 2 2021 The soldier referenced in Figure 2 10 Aghasi Hovhannisyan became lost with another soldier during a severe snowstorm and died on March 21st or 22nd 141 The exclamation in the graphic refers to Zangazeur which is the name of both the mountain appears the national emblem of Armenia upside down and with a bullet range in which the soldier died and an important battle in Armenian history 142 hole atop the Armenian national flag This post received 2 500 views Its inclusion in the graphic may have a double meaning intended to mock 91 likes 5 comments and 9 shares as of September 2 2021 Armenian military pride The most common appellation rat was often applied to dead Armenian These Polygon Azerbaijan VK posts and images have been reposted to Twitter soldiers as is the case in Figure 1 3 This post was made on October 11 accounts 143 message boards 144 and independent news sites 145 Figures 506 likes 61 comments and 21 shares as of September 2 2021 Figure 1 4 provides another example of Polygon Azerbaijan referring FIGURE 1 5 In addition to the Armenian military equipment details in image the author also includes a skull and bullet pocked Armenian national emblem Below the image is a linked music file with text translating to Last Dance of the Rat Black Trumpet to dead Armenian soldiers as rats Russian This content was 28 from the viewer a sense of dehumanization and celebration of the deaths of Armenian military members In the bottom right of the image there 2020133 during the height of the Fall conflict It received 23 000 views FIGURE 1 3 The video titled Deathrat stationary dance of the Armenian invaders appears to be low flying drone footage of a purported Armenian trench line and dead Armenian soldiers circled in red by the content creator Translation category here I come Deathrat stationary dance of the Armenian invaders Hans Kloss Based on mobile application here I come 2 2021 The uniform equipment and symbols of the Armenian state evoke 1 5 1 6 show that Polygon Azerbaijan continued to post content derogatory of Armenians and the Armenian military well after the end of the Fall 2020 conflict This reflects the continued enmity directed at Armenians online and the danger of renewed hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia 146 posted on October 18 2020134 during the height of the Fall conflict As mentioned Polygon Azerbaijan is connected to a larger visual media The post received 17 000 views 531 likes 58 comments and 16 shares network which includes the video journalism projects Caliber az as well as of September 2 2021 In this case the soldiers are claimed to have as RADIUS a program which ran on Azerbaijani State television 147 Kloss been killed near Fuzuli 135 In addition the post also describes Armenians partnered with Azerbaijani state television host Heydar Mirza in developing as which means nosy or big nosed In some cases Armenians both programs 148 Heydar Mirza is the professional face of this media express pride or poke gentle fun at their noses 136 however Polygon network with a background in military and political analysis He has a Ph D in Azerbaijan draws attention to this feature in a mocking and demeaning International Relations from Freie Universit t Berlin and worked as a strategic manner that is reminiscent of prominent anti Semitic stereotypes 137 FIGURE 1 6 The author has added a weapon and Armenian military cap to the image as well as a skull and the English word Destroyed The name of Aghasi Hovhannisyan appears in a black box at the top of the image At the bottom is a linked music file with text translating to Last Dance of the Rat Black Trumpet studies analyst under the Azerbaijani president for eight years 149 In the partnership between Kloss and Mirza there is a kind of official legitimacy lent to the type of content posted on Polygon Azerbaijan 29

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Polygon Azerbaijan sites promote both Caliber az and RADIUS content violates these policies and is maliciously posted may be deleted or result in a which tends to be free of the explicitly derogatory elements that pervade user losing their account repeated violations may result in a permanent ban Kloss own site Still even these more professional sites occasionally from the platform 162 include references to the extreme narratives promoted on Polygon Azerbaijan as demonstrated in Figure 1 7 FIGURE 1 7 The top left panel is an enhanced version of the emblem that appears on the preview screen of the two Caliber az YouTube videos150 shown in the two panels on the right The bottom left panel is the official emblem of the Armed Forces of Armenia Both emblems on the left contain the same Armenian wording which translates to Armenian Armed Forces The video on the top right was posted March 17 2021 and has received 12 376 views 103 comments and 1 100 upvotes to 18 downvotes The video on the bottom right was posted March 23 2021 and has received 11 114 views 71 comments and 917 upvotes to 12 downvotes prohibited content under VK s Terms of Service Under the platform s policies 1 Compliance with Relevant Platform Standards The VK Terms of Service151 state that a user is prohibited from making available any content that contains threats or calls to violence including ones made implicitly praises or encourages violent actions or discredits insults defiles one s honor dignity or business reputation 152 contains scenes of inhumane treatment of animals 153 propagates and or incites racial religious or ethnic hatred or hostility including hatred or hostility towards a specific gender orientation or any other individual attributes or characteristics of a person 154 propagandizes and or contributes to racial religious ethnic hatred or hostility propagandizes fascism or racial superiority 155 or is of fraudulent nature 156 Under its Safety Guidelines 157 VK explicitly prohibits users from spreading hate speech or to otherwise victimize or belittle an individual or group of people based on religion culture race ethnicity nationality sexual or gender identity developmental differences illness etc The platform claims to block accounts that spread content that contains verbal assertion s of superiority of some groups over others to rationalize violence discrimination segregation or isolation on the basis of religion ethnicity nationality sexual or gender identity developmental differences or illness even in cases in which the content 30 Polygon Azerbaijan s content is consistent with multiple categories of VK s each of the example posts should have been removed and there is a strong case that the entire account should be taken down The Polygon Azerbaijan posts presented here propagate and propagandize racial and ethnic hostility or hatred in violation of VK s Terms of Service 6 3 4e f The posts in Figures 1 3 1 6 all include graphic or written comparisons of Armenians to rats which falls under VK s description of hate speech in its Platform Standards 163 In each of these posts the comparison to vermin is made within the context of the death or injury of Armenians posts in Figures 1 4 and 1 7 depict actual physical violence to people who are described as Armenian service members The inclusion of this context plausibly may be said to glorify violence or incite hostility as the depiction or description of violence in these posts is celebratory particularly for the posts in Figures 1 4 1 5 and 1 7 The posts in Figures 1 5 1 6 and 1 7 also describe Armenians by the physical size of their noses The negative stereotype equating this physical characteristic with the Armenian nationality ethnicity and race and its use in content that promotes or celebrates physical violence targeted at Armenians violate VK s Platform Standards by asserting the superiority of Azerbaijanis over Armenians to rationalize violence and discrimination on the basis of nationality and ethnicity 164 is posted as a joke or meme 158 Qualifying assertions include comparing According to VK policies the satirical nature of many of the example posts a specific group of people to insects filth subhumans inferior types is no defense against moderation Under VK s maliciousness test Polygon and other such language 159 VK further asks users to refrain from Azerbaijan s posts demonstrate 1 animosity based on certain characteristics posting content that glorifies violence depicts physical harm or contains or differences e g big nosed 2 offensive behavior contempt toward disinformation 160 The platform does acknowledge the importance of other people s values or views and 3 expression of personal superiority context in assessing prohibited content and moderators are instructed accompanied by a baseless and unfair attitude toward a specific individual or to look for evidence that content was posted maliciously 161 Content that group of people e g Armenian soldiers killed in combat 31

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Given the extremity of the content available on the Polygon Azerbaijan account not clearly encompassed by the examples provided in the Platform Standards particularly as it promotes hostility and hatred toward Armenians of ethnic and may be more difficult to predict Therefore we recommend that VK update its national identities VK s policies require that at the least all eight offending Platform Standards policy to make explicit its definition of hate speech and clarify posts be removed and there is a persuasive case that the owner should the criteria it uses to identify and moderate all forms of hate speech lose the account be permanently banned or both Hans Kloss and Polygon VK s Platform Standards document describes its hate speech policy as intended Azerbaijan likely qualify for these severe sanctions under VK s policy against to ensure a safe environment for all 170 Although this is vague it likely posting hate speech as well as under its policy on repeat violators comports with the Article 19 3 a restriction in favor of respecting the rights 2 Compliance with international human rights law or reputations of others 171 Businesses including social media companies should respect human rights This means that they should avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved 165 Hate speech is a prohibited form of expression under Article 20 2 ICCPR Any restriction of hate speech must meet with the cumulative requirements of Article 19 3 ICCPR i that any restriction be provided by law ii that the restriction pursue either a the legitimate ground of respecting the rights or reputations of others or b of protecting national order public order or public health or morals and iii that the restriction be necessary and proportionate 166 The posts presented from Polygon Azerbaijan qualify under the UN definition of hate speech as expressive content that uses pejorative or discriminatory language with reference to a person or a group on the basis of their ethnicity nationality race or other identity factor 167 Further this content is test of the Rabat Plan of Action172 provides a robust deliberative highthreshold framework to assess whether moderation actions are necessary and proportionate to the content in question considering the totality of the circumstances This was originally developed to assess the necessity of adopting criminal measures against hate speech 173 but has since been extended beyond expression that is criminalized 174 This test includes 1 social and political context 2 the speaker s position or status 3 the intent of the speaker 4 the content and form of the statement 5 the extent of its dissemination 6 the likelihood of harm including imminence 1 C ontext A state of open large scale armed conflict existed between Armenia and Azerbaijan between the months of September and November prohibited by Article 20 2 ICCPR which outlaws any advocacy of national racial 2020 For months before and in the many months following almost or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination hostility or continuous armed confrontations occurred between the countries resulting violence in combat casualties The cease fire negotiated in November 2020 remains 168 In particular Polygon Azerbaijan s use of the offending terms and images in combination with military content promotes hostility and potentially uneasy and current conditions on the ground resemble to some degree violence toward Armenians the build up to war that existed in July and August of 2020 Meanwhile the VK s policy on hate speech is provided by law as required by Article 19 3 as it is contained in the Platform Standards section of their publicly available Safety Guidelines document 169 The examples contained in the Safety Guidelines provide users with a clear understanding of particular categories of prohibited content VK policies make clear that the content in these posts is prohibited and should be moderated However the outcome for other content that which is 32 When considering moderation of hate speech in particular the six part Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has celebrated his country s victory in a manner that is meant to humiliate Armenia175 and has used dehumanizing language to describe Armenians 176 It is in this context of intense international armed conflict and national and ethnic enmity that Polygon Azerbaijan s posts appeared presenting Armenians as dangerous and subhuman at a time and in a region where there remains a high probability 33

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of violence These posts also reflect a broader strategic use of hate speech by Azerbaijan s political leaders Consequently the social and political a continuing campaign and appears on a publicly accessible website where context increases the severity of the content and favors moderation it is encountered by thousands of people who have access to the target 2 S tatus of the speaker the speaker Hans Kloss the account owner purports to be a military expert who has worked for and appeared on Azerbaijan state television He also collaborates with Heydar Mirza a television personality and former national security official in the Azerbaijani President s administration Kloss content is popular with his intended Russian and Azerbaijani speaking audience and his posts are often reposted to other platforms As a popular and politically connected figure within Azerbaijani media Kloss status favors moderation 3 I ntent a speaker s intent to incite is signaled by the deliberate coupling of hate speech and depictions of violence against a group The posts from Polygon Azerbaijan combine hate speech with visual depictions or written descriptions of physical violence committed against members of the Armenian military In some cases this includes graphic photos or videos showing dead Armenian service members Further Mirza and Kloss produce a significant amount of content that would appeal to military members or military hobbyists 177 and Polygon Azerbaijan posts are reposted to military themed message boards 178 Polygon Azerbaijan posts celebrate the killings woundings and accidental deaths of Armenian service personnel with dead rat memes and dehumanizing language These elements suggest intent to incite and favor moderation 4 C ontent and form The Polygon Azerbaijan posts are one sided were created by a single person and most present no intellectual argument The account is hostile to alternative views Armenian perspectives are only featured in Polygon Azerbaijan posts as an opportunity for mockery or derision not legitimate points of argument The posts appear targeted to provoke strong emotional reactions from the audience as well as the targets The substance and form of the speech favor moderation 34 5 Dissemination Content is more liable to be moderated when it is part of population 179 Polygon Azerbaijan is on the VK social media platform and its content is available to anyone with a VK account 180 The posts that presented here are not isolated examples but contain themes and language that are repeated many times in content that spans from well before the Fall conflict to at least summer 2021 Many of the examples here have been reposted to news sites 181 other VK accounts 182 Twitter accounts 183 and standalone sites 184 The collaboration between Kloss and Mirza extends the reach of this content even further and into more traditional and official Azerbaijani media beyond VK The Caliber az project is ostensibly a video journalism project that reports on the ongoing conflict 185 however even on Caliber az videos the Armeniansas rats messaging appears Because the content is widely accessible online and much of the audience has access to the target population the extent of the speech increases its severity and favors moderation 6 L ikelihood of harm The Polygon Azerbaijan posts promote narratives that suggest Armenians are 1 dangerous and deserve to be the targets of violence 2 subhuman and do not deserve dignity or safety e g Armenians are rats creatures or 3 incompetent and draw injury upon themselves e g mocking soldiers who become lost in a snowstorm These narratives which mirror those promoted by media outlets prior to and during the Rwandan genocide186 in combination with the similarly hateful and violent rhetoric promoted by Azerbaijan s political establishment increase the risk of violence thereby increases the severity of the speech and favors moderation An analysis of each of the six Rabat factors shows that this content on the Polygon Azerbaijan VK account meets the threshold for criminalisation under national law and should be removed from the site Given the extreme nature of these posts there is a case to be made that the entire account should have been blocked VK states that it blocks accounts in cases of the most egregious speech or of repeat violators of content policies otherwise moderation may 35

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be limited to warning or post deletion At minimum these pieces of 1 Compliance with Relevant Platform Standards content on the Polygon Azerbaijan VK account should have be blocked or Twitter s Synthetic and manipulated media policy provides that users may deleted and in failing to do so VK failed to apply its own platform law and not deceptively promote synthetic or manipulated media that are likely to to respect human rights cause harm 190 Additionally Twitter may label Tweets containing synthetic and manipulated media to help people understand their authenticity and to provide CASE STUDY 2 AZERBAIJAN MFA TWEET APPLYING TWITTER PLATFORM LAW During the conflict it was not uncommon for Azerbaijani public officials to make statements on Twitter claiming that attacking civilian populations was a standard practice of the Armenian forces 187 We did not find examples of similar content posted by Armenian officials On October 7 2020 a video was posted on Twitter by the user Armenian Occupation Watch ArmenOccupWatch According to the bio this account is managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan MFA The video showed a clip of FIGURE 2 1 Screenshot of the video posted to Twitter by the Armenian Occupation Watch which received 1 9k views as of August 13 2021 Vagharshak Harutyunyan a former advisor to the Armenian Prime Minister during the conflict speaking Armenian with English subtitles see Figure 1 1 188 The post claimed that Harutyunyan was explaining that Armenia s is purposefully shelling peaceful cities of Azerbaijan This video had received 1 9k views as of August 13 2021 The Twitter post received 110 likes 93 retweets and 13 comments as of the same date The same clip was posted by another Twitter user Shahlam_ on October 9 2020 although the clip did not include the English subtitles like the video posted by ArmenOccupWatch 189 The Shahlam_ Tweet revealed that the clip was from YouTube and featured the title of the video 20 00 05 10 20 We were able to use this title to identify the original video on YouTube from which the clip of Harutyunyan was taken That video was posted to YouTube on October 5 2020 by 24 a Russian news FIGURE 2 2 The original clip on YouTube posted on October 5 2020 Harutyunyan is talking about they referring to the Azerbaijanis translated using YouTube s auto generated English translation and confirmed by members of our team channel see Figure 1 2 By listening to the original clip with YouTube s automated English translation turned on we were able to identify that the English subtitles in the ArmenOccupWatch post are misleading Harutyunyan is not speaking about Armenia s military tactics he is speaking additional context 191 Twitter enforces its Synthetic and manipulated media policy in accordance with a three part test that asks i whether the content was significantly and deceptively altered or fabricated ii whether the content was shared in a deceptive manner and iii whether the content is likely to impact public safety or cause serious harm 192 Different enforcement actions are taken depending on how many of these criteria the content in question satisfies 193 In assessing criterion i on whether the media has been deceptively altered Twitter expressly notes in its policy that it considers whether modified subtitles have been added 194 Twitter provides it is most likely to take strong moderation action against media that has been significantly altered e g spliced and reordered or slowed down to change its meaning however under Twitter s rules content containing subtler forms of manipulation such as presentation with false context may be labeled or removed on a case by case basis 195 When assessing criterion ii on whether the content was shared in a deceptive manner Twitter considers whether the content suggests a deliberate intent to deceive people taking into account the text of the Tweet and information on the profile of the account sharing the media 196 Finally in analyzing criterion iii on whether the content is likely to impact public safety or cause serious harm Twitter considers inter alia threats to the physical safety of a person or group and the risk of mass violence or widespread civil unrest 197 Here the MFA Tweet added inaccurate subtitles to the video featuring the Armenian official which satisfies criterion i As the inaccurate subtitles had to be created it seems likely that this deception was intentionally shared which satisfies criterion ii Whether or not criterion iii is satisfied is more complex Broadly it could be argued that because the MFA s post claims that Armenia deliberately strikes at civilians it was created in order to incite panic and to stir about the military tactics of Azerbaijan This was further confirmed by up further animosity between the two sides which could impact public safety members of our team who are familiar with the language being spoken in or cause serious harm if content consumers used this information as a pretext the 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to respond to the perceived Armenian action Twitter considers the time explains the enforcement action Twitter will take depending on how much of frame within which the content may be likely to impact public safety or cause the criteria in its three part test is satisfied This policy can be easily located serious harm 198 so the potential for serious harm is supported by the fact that on Twitter s Help Center which means that the policy has also been made the post was made on October 7 2020 just 10 days after the physical conflict accessible to the public However Twitter could improve its transparency by materialized Twitter identifies some specific harms included in criterion iii being specific about when labels will be applied and the content of those labels including threats to the physical safety of a person or group risk of mass rather than just providing that labeling is likely violence or widespread civil unrest threats to the privacy or ability of a person or group to freely express themselves or participate in civic events While this list is not exhaustive it does not appear that this Tweet would cause serious harm of this nature Consequently we conclude that although the MFA s post does heighten tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan the link between this content and serious harm is perhaps too tenuous criterion iii However under Twitter s policy a post does not need to satisfy all three criteria For content that satisfies criteria i and ii 199 Twitter s policy states that it is likely to be labeled No such action was taken against this post Twitter s policy rationale for its Synthetic and manipulated media policy states that You may not share synthetic manipulated or out of context media that may deceive or confuse people and lead to harm 201 This is vague It could be read as aimed at protecting public order and in more extreme circumstances national security under Article 19 3 b but it is not explicit To be more transparent Twitter should make the human rights that it seeks to protect more explicit on the face of the policy in order to provide greater clarity Whether a restriction on this expression would comport with the necessity and proportionality test of Article 19 3 depends on the type of restriction applied In its policy Twitter states that it may use its own technology or receive reports Since the MFA is a department of the State of Azerbaijan and the content it through partnerships with third parties in order to determine if media has posted relates to the conflict the post is political speech and is subject to been deceptively altered particularly strong protection under the right to freedom of expression 202 We 200 It may be the case that Twitter s algorithms and third party partners did not detect the MFA s post so we recommend that find that removal of the MFA Tweet would not be necessary and proportionate Twitter s algorithms and partners prioritize synthetic and manipulated media because as discussed above we do not believe that it reaches the serious shared in the context of an armed conflict harm threshold expounded by Twitter that would warrant its removal 203 2 Compliance with international human rights law In order for content moderation to respect human rights law it needs to meet the cumulative criteria of Article 19 3 ICCPR i that any restriction be provided by law ii that the restriction pursue either a the legitimate ground of respecting the rights or reputations of others or b of protecting national order public order or public health or morals and iii that the restriction be necessary and proportionate By setting out a three part test that delineates Twitter s approach to synthetic and manipulated media Twitter s policy is formulated with sufficient precision The objective could be met via the less restrictive action of labeling the MFA Tweet as manipulated and inaccurate as permitted under Twitter s policy which would be necessary and proportionate in this instance This conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that the real video which excludes the MFA s modified subtitles is freely available on YouTube and can be used to countermessage the MFA Tweet Consequently we conclude that this Twitter policy respects human rights as articulated in Article 19 3 of the ICCPR although it failed to uphold its own platform law in not labeling the MFA Tweet to allow individuals to foresee the types of conduct that are prohibited under Twitter could improve its approach to misleading content by adding links to the policy and thus accords with the provided by law component of Article trustworthy sources as part of its enforcement response 19 3 It is especially helpful that Twitter includes a table in its policy which 38 39

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CASE STUDY 3 ARMENIA ARTSAKH AWARENESS CENTER AAAC POST APPLYING FACEBOOK PLATFORM LAW observably look like an ear at all Rather than appear life like the ear in the AAAC Facebook video is nearly flat and surrounded by flappy excess skin Moreover Amnesty International points out that the uniforms of On November 4 2020 a Facebook user by the name of the ArmeniaArtsakh Awareness Center AAAC posted a video allegedly showing Azerbaijani forces cutting off the ears of an Armenian soldier see Figures 3 1 and 3 2 204 This account was created on October 6 2020 in the midst of the conflict and was actively posting pro Armenia antiFIGURE 3 1 conclude that this video is not authentic At the time of the conflict Facebook s Violent and Graphic Content to a private citizen based in Los Angeles Many of this person s posts on policy prohibited posting videos of people or dead bodies in non medical the AAAC s Facebook page including the ear cutting video contain pleas settings if they depicted dismemberment 210 Facebook s rationale for its for donations to the ArmeniaFund a nonprofit organization dedicated Violent and Graphic Content policy stipulates that Facebook remove s to serving the humanitarian needs of Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh content that glorifies violence or celebrates the suffering or humiliation Artsakh 205 of others because it may create an environment that discourages including YouTube VK and Twitter as evidenced in Figures 3 3 3 5 An OSINT investigation carried out by Amnesty International s Crisis Evidence Lab confirmed the authenticity of twenty two videos depicting gruesome mutilations and extrajudicial executions of enemy soldiers by both Armenian and Azerbaijani forces during the conflict 206 Earcutting by both Armenian and Azerbaijani perpetrators was thus not uncommon during the conflict 207 but comparing the Facebook video posted by the AAAC with videos and images authenticated by Amnesty International raises questions of the authenticity of the AAAC video Journalist Jake Hanrahan posted authentic images of Azerbaijani soldiers cutting off the ears of Armenians to Twitter 208 Of note is the fact that blood is visibly apparent in these images a feature that is missing in the AAAC Facebook video On the contrary the ear in the AAAC Facebook 40 distinctive features are missing from the AAAC Facebook video We as of August 12 2021 We were able to trace ownership of this account became clear that this video had spread to other social media platforms FIGURE 3 4 The video was uploaded to VK on November 5 2020 amassing 5 924 views as of August 3 2021 shoulder and a patch with the soldier s blood type on the sleeve 209 These 1 Compliance with Relevant Platform Standards 3 1 3 2 taken from the video using Google Images and Yandex Images it FIGURE 3 3 The video was uploaded to YouTube on December 18 2020 amassing 1 236 views as of August 12 2021 FIGURE 3 5 A screen capture from the video was also shared on Twitter on December 17 2020 garnering 281 retweets and 258 likes as of August 3 2021 Azerbaijan content up until April 1 2021 It has amassed 1 553 followers By performing a reverse image search on the screenshots at Figure FIGURE 3 2 Azerbaijani soldiers are typically marked by the Azerbaijani flag on the video is scrupulously clean as is the knife that was used to allegedly cut off that ear No blood is detectable anywhere in the AAAC Facebook video In addition the ear in the AAAC Facebook video does not participation on Facebook 211 The policy rationale further provides that Facebook allow s graphic content with some limitations to help people raise awareness about these issues 212 For content that falls within the policy Facebook indicates that it will include a warning screen so that people are aware that the content may be disturbing 213 In this case the AAAC s post does not glorify violence or celebrate the plight of the Armenian soldiers instead it does the opposite by calling out the alleged Azerbaijani military violations of the treatment of prisoners of war Consequently the post did not violate Facebook s Violent and Graphic Content policy and therefore was properly not the subject of moderation under this policy Facebook s Violence and Incitement policy prohibits posting m isinformation and unverifiable rumors that contribute to the risk of imminent violence or physical harm 214 According to an update made to this policy on Facebook Newsroom a month before the conflict broke out misinformation that does not attain the imminent harm threshold but is rated false by third party fact checkers will be downranked in the News Feed 215 Here context matters 216 This post was made five days before the conflict came to an end when there was still uncertainty over whether 41

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temporary peace could ever be accomplished between the two sides In Facebook s Violence and Incitement policy and misinformation and imminent addition the post casts Azerbaijani soldiers as war crime perpetrators which harm rule are publicly accessible on Facebook s Transparency Center and could feed into negative generalizations about Azerbaijanis On the other appears to meet with the legitimate ground required by Article 19 3 as Facebook hand the post did not use derogatory language against Azerbaijanis states that its goal is to prevent offline harm and threats to public safety 218 217 and did not enjoy substantial user engagement Although the ear cutting video However the rule contains two major deficiencies First the rule does not define was circulated across different platforms the post made by the AAAC was not misinformation leaving open to interpretation of the types of prohibited liked shared or commented on very much which points to a lack of imminent content This is a problem that has been raised by the Facebook Oversight Board harm Thus under Facebook s policy the post should not have been removed more than once 219 Second the rule does not explain what the imminent harm but it could have been downranked if rated false by third party fact checkers threshold is Consequently this rule does not fulfill the provided by law criteria There is nothing to suggest that the post was indeed rated false by third party of Article 19 3 and as the test is cumulative content moderation under the policy fact checkers so we recommend that Facebook provide greater transparency would not be permitted by international human rights law on how it partners with third party fact checkers and how its algorithms and human review processes work Even if the Article 19 3 test were met for the misinformation and imminent harm rule Facebook s policy which permits downranking the content if 2 Compliance with international human rights law it is rated false by third party fact checkers is not sufficient The post was Whether this content can be restricted under international human rights law made during the conflict which should have triggered Facebook s heightened depends on the satisfaction of the cumulative three requirements of Article responsibility to respect human rights under the UNGPs Therefore just as 19 3 ICCPR i that any restriction be provided by law ii that the restriction the FBOB has recommended that Facebook prioritize referring content to its pursue either a the legitimate ground of respecting the rights or reputations fact checkers when the content concerns a public position on debated health of others or b of protecting national order public order or public health or policy issues particularly in the context of a pandemic 220 we recommend that morals and iii that the restriction be necessary and proportionate Facebook prioritize referring content that makes dubious claims about an Facebook could have moderated this content in line with the requirements of Article 19 3 Its Violent and Graphic Content policy meets the first requirement of Article 19 3 as it is sufficiently precise and the policy is publically available It appears as though the policy is aimed at respect ing the rights or reputation of others and so satisfies the second requirement The method of moderation provided under the policy is limited to providing a warning armed conflict to its fact checkers Also we recommend that Facebook expand its policy to include alternative less intrusive measures to downranking such as affixing a label that warns users of misinformation and or directs users to trusted sources of information These measures could protect users freedom of expression while also allowing other users to explore alternative sources of trustworthy information which is not particularly restrictive and so would likely meet the necessity and We conclude that Facebook s Violence and Incitement policy and proportionality test the third requirement of Article 19 3 However the post misinformation and imminent harm rule do not comply with the requirements would not be moderated under the terms of the policy as it is specifically for restricting expression under Article 19 3 To bring the rule into alignment directed at content that glorifies violence or celebrates the suffering or with the provided by law requirement Facebook should provide a clear humiliation of others which this post did not do We note that this might be an definition of relevant terms to provide clarity for users Facebook should also unsatisfactory outcome as it allows violent and graphic content which is posted elaborate on how they determine whether the threshold of imminent harm for other purposes such as this has been met Facebook should always pursue the least restrictive means of content moderation to meet the policy goal 42 43

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CASE STUDY 4 KARABAKH IS AZERBAIJAN KIAZ APPLYING INSTAGRAM PLATFORM LAW 4 4 4 5 The post s caption alleges that from the video footage shared from Armenian mass media it can be clearly observed that civilians are actively attending to military operations This way Armenian government is The conflict witnessed the rise of student driven patriotic astroturfing which describes the phenomenon whereby small coordinated accounts post at a high volume to create the impression that an online movement enjoys more support than it actually does 221 A prominent example of FIGURE 4 1 KIAz s Facebook post from December 2 2020 translated using Google Translate Translation Dear Rector of Baku Engineering University Professor Havar Mammadov and teachers we thank the staff as a platform Karabakh is Azerbaijan Founded in June 2020 sic through online and social media platforms our platform unites all differences and unites under one goal This goal is to convey the realities of Azerbaijan and Karabakh to the world Both our successful participation in the information war during the Second Karabakh War as well as the successes we will achieve in our subsequent activities for the purpose are the result of the value and assistance you provide as well as our team So thanks to the conditions you have created for our volunteer team at Baku Engineering University your support access to the Internet technical equipment and being with us both materially and spiritually we have successfully signed in the information war Therefore as the Karabakh is Azerbaijan platform we sincerely thank all the university staff including Professor Havar Mammadov able to clearly write off many casualties as civilians FIGURE 4 3 An image from Instagram of one of the co founders of KIAz being granted an award by Azerbaijani Member of Parliament Adil Aliyev video Through a reverse image search on Yandex Images we found an a student led activist group that was active during the conflict is the Instagram account run by a user named hraparak_tv that uses the same Karabakh is Azerbaijan KIAz platform which operates Instagram 222 logo The video was shared by that user on October 2 2020 a day before Facebook the video was posted by KIAz and contains a similar caption as the post 223 Twitter 224 YouTube 225 and Telegram 226 accounts As of August 3 2021 the platform had 18 7k 25k 5 69k 1 61k and 601 made by KIAz While there is a legitimate Armenian media outlet named followers on each of its accounts respectively Hraparak TV this harapak_tv Instagram account is not an official account According to KIAz s About page on YouTube the platform was created FIGURE 4 4 Screenshot of KIAz s Instagram of that outlet see Figure 4 6 The legitimate Hraparak TV has confirmed post from October 3 2020 229 that the hraparak_tv Instagram account is an unofficial account run by a group of patriotic youth on July 13 2020 two days after the July by Azerbaijanis designed to look like the content being posted to that 2020 clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan had materialized 227 account is derived from legitimate Armenian media 230 Review of posts across their different platforms reveals that the group is supported by the Baku Engineering University a university Upon conducting further reverse image searches of the screenshots established in 2016 under the order of the President of Azerbaijan taken from the video using Yandex Images we discovered that there were Ilham Aliyev to train students on how to become professionals in the actually two versions of this video in circulation on social media the one field of engineering technology 228 A Facebook post from KIAz Figure 4 1 specifically thanks the rector of the university Professor Havar FIGURE 4 5 The men circled in red by the content creator are civilians according to KIAz logo seen in the screenshot of the YouTube video We performed a that simultaneously took place during the conflict According to their awards by an Azerbaijani Member of Parliament for their efforts during and the KIAz Instagram account and a second video posted to YouTube Most notably the logo in the video posted by KIAz does not match the contributions to the information war between Armenia and Azerbaijan Facebook and Instagram accounts the group was presented with two that was posted by both the unofficial hraparak_tv Instagram account see Figure 4 7 231 Mammadov who was appointed to this position under the order of President Aliyev and goes on to express pride in the platform s FIGURE 4 6 Image of the real Hraparak TV s official Instagram account which does not match the account that posted the video the information war see Figures 4 2 and 4 3 FIGURE 4 2 Image from Facebook of one of the co founders of KIAz being handed an award by Azerbaijani Member of Parliament Adil Aliyev There is a logo in the upper left corner of a screenshot taken from the reverse image search of the YouTube video logo on Yandex Images which yielded several results including a Tweet linking the original video featuring the same logo from the YouTube video 232 The original video is from an Armenian media outlet 1in am and was posted on October 1 2020 233 a day before the unofficial hraparak_tv posted the video KIAz s commitment to the information war is evident across their social media accounts on different platforms For example on October 3 2020 In the center left of the original YouTube video at Figure 4 7 there is a KIAz posted a video to their Instagram account The video depicts two man who is hunched over and can be seen wearing a dark jacket a pair individuals circled in red by the content creator who appear not to be in of jeans and striped shoes This man s plain clothing seems to be the military uniform and are helping with artillery preparations see Figures reason why KIAz claims that civilians are involved in Armenia s military FIGURE 4 7 From YouTube 44 45

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operations in its October 3 2020 Instagram post as these are the elements The KIAz s Instagram post appears to be misinformation and therefore raises a that are circled in red by KIAz in Figure 3 5 question under the Violence and Incitement policy as to whether it contributed 234 However in reviewing the original video posted by 1in am on October 1 2020 in its entirety it appears to a risk of imminent violence or physical harm According to the FBOB it is that the men were not civilians Starting at the 2 45 minute mark the reporter paramount to consider the local context and current situation in a State when in the 1in am video starts conversing with the men whom the reporter refers assessing the imminent harm threshold 240 Here the post was made on to as soldiers asking them about the recent attacks in Nagorno Karabakh October 3 2020 just six days after the conflict began when tensions between Artsakh and their work This was confirmed by a member of our team who is Armenia and Azerbaijan were already running high By making false allegations fluent in the language being spoken It is during this segment that the same about the Armenian government s military tactics the post could have arguably man who KIAz alleges is a civilian in Figure 3 5 appears in the background spurred further enmity between the two sides particularly when viewed in light He is wearing the same jacket jeans and striped shoes that we previously of KIAz s stated goal of winning the information war for Azerbaijan However identified but underneath that jacket he is wearing an army shirt just like the rest of the soldiers in the video This crucial part of the video was selectively the post does not say anything derogatory against Armenians 241 and it does edited out of the version that was posted by the unofficial hraparak_tv which harm against Armenia or Armenians Consequently despite containing false was then reposted by KIAz on October 3 2020 The unofficial hraparak_tv Instagram account also selectively edited the reporter s conversation with the soldiers out of the 1in am video which provides important context to show the information about Armenians utilizing civilians in combat it is unlikely that any content moderation action would be appropriate under the current rules men are not civilians We found numerous instances where the Azerbaijani 2 Compliance with international human rights law media made the same allegations based on this content 235 Misinformation and disinformation are not prohibited forms of expression 1 Compliance with Relevant Platform Standards Instagram s Community Guidelines incorporate many of Facebook s Community Standards including Facebook s Violence and Incitement policy 236 This policy prohibits posting m isinformation and unverifiable rumors that contribute to the risk of imminent violence or physical harm 237 In an update to this policy it was clarified that m isinformation that does not put people at risk of imminent violence or physical harm but is rated false by third party fact checkers will be downranked so that fewer people are exposed to it 238 Additionally Instagram has a policy on reducing the spread of false information which at the time of the conflict was meager and provided an external link to a Facebook announcement about how Facebook addresses fake news This Facebook announcement stated that technology and human review is used to identify and downrank false news that is rated false by thirdparty fact checkers provide more context on false news or remove pages that repeatedly share false news 239 46 not expressly or impliedly suggest a risk of imminent violence or physical under international human rights law To respect human rights content can only be restricted if the three cumulative criteria of Article 19 3 ICCPR are met KIAz s Instagram post touches upon a matter of public interest namely civilian involvement in the conflict so it is categorized as political speech which is subject to particularly strong protection under Article 19 2 ICCPR 242 The relevant law in question for an Article 19 3 analysis is Facebook s Violence and Incitement policy and to be exact the misinformation and imminent harm rule contained in that policy which also applies to Instagram In its rationale for this policy Facebook states that its goal is to prevent offline harm and threats to public safety 243 Thus the rule pursues the legitimate grounds of respecting the rights of others and protecting public safety and national security required by Article 19 3 However as discussed above the rule does not satisfy the provided by law requirement as it is missing definitions of misinformation and imminent harm The policy therefore fails to meet the requirements to justify a restriction of expression that respects human rights 47

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ENDNOTES See Christopher Giles Upasana Bhat Nagorno Karabakh The Armenian Azeri information wars BBC Oct 26 2020 https www bbc com news world europe 54614392 The Oxford Internet Institute concluded that the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan or private firms they work with employed cyber troop teams consisting of full time staff members coordinating with multiple actors to control the information space including to advance disinformation campaigns See Samantha Bradshaw et al Industrialized Disinformation 2020 Global Inventory of Organized Social Media Manipulation 18 19 Jan 13 2021 https demtech oii ox ac uk wp content uploads sites 127 2021 01 CyberTroop Report 2020 v 2 pdf 1 See e g International Committee of the Red Cross ICRC Harmful Information Misinformation disinformation and hate speech in armed conflict and other situations of violence ICRC initial findings and perspectives on adapting protection approaches 5 July 9 2021 https shop icrc org harmful information misinformation disinformation and hate speech in armed conflict and other situations of violence icrc initial findings and perspectives on adapting protection approaches pdf en hereinafter ICRC report at 11 20 2 This is enshrined in principle 11 of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights UNGPs adopted by the Human Rights Council in 2011 John Ruggie Special Representative of the Secretary General Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights Implementing the United Nations Protect Respect and Remedy Framework UN Doc A HRC 17 31 principle 11 Mar 21 2011 hereinafter UN Guiding Principles David Kaye the former UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression has been at the vanguard of advocating for the application of the UNGPs responsibility to respect framework as a launchpad for reforming social media companies platform policies Kaye champions smart regulation whereby States focus on bolstering company transparency while social media companies engage in a human rights by default approach with respect to their platforms David Kaye Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression UN Doc A HRC 38 35 1 Apr 6 2018 hereinafter Kaye 2018 Report 3 Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises Human rights and conflict affected regions towards heightened action UN Doc A 75 212 13 July 21 2020 hereinafter Working Group Report 4 21 Id at 98 22 UN Guiding Principles supra note 3 23 ICCPR supra note 7 at art 19 2 24 Khan 2021 Report supra note 8 at 38 25 GC 34 supra note 9 at 12 26 Id at 22 ICCPR supra note 7 at art 20 1 The terms propaganda for war and war propaganda have been used interchangeably See e g OSCE Office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media Propaganda and Freedom of the Media 17 2015 https www osce org files f documents b 3 203926 pdf Propaganda for war seems to apply only to expressions made prior to the outbreak of armed conflict War propaganda is understood as a broad tool that is typically weaponized during an armed conflict to promote the national war effort domestically to demoralize the enemy to strengthen relations among allies or to compel neutral States to join one side of the war or another See Ralph D Casey What Is Propaganda American Hist Ass n July 1944 https www historians org about aha and membership aha history and archives gi roundtable series pamphlets em 2 what is propaganda 1944 war propaganda 27 28 Michael G Kearney The Prohibition of Propaganda for War in International Law 132 2007 hereinafter Kearney 29 In Resolution 381 V the General Assembly declared that propaganda includes 1 incitement to conflicts or acts of aggression 2 measures tending to isolate the peoples from any contact with the outside world and 3 measures tending to silence or distort the UN s activities in favor of peace or to prevent their peoples from knowing the views of other Member States See GA Res 381 V UNGA 5th Sess UN Doc A RES 381 V Nov 17 1950 See also Resolution 110 II in which the UN General Assembly condemned all forms of propaganda that are designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace breach of the peace or act of aggression G A Res 110 II UNGA 2d Sess UN Doc A RES 2 110 Nov 3 1947 30 Third Committee UNGA 16th Sess UN Doc A C 3 SR 1079 2 Mr Mello Oct 20 1961 hereinafter Third Committee proceedings See also Kearney supra note 28 at 132 Kaye 2018 Report supra note 3 5 6 ICRC report supra note 1 at 11 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art 19 2 opened for signature Dec 16 1966 entered into force Mar 23 1976 hereinafter ICCPR 7 8 Irene Khan Disinformation and freedom of opinion and expression UN Doc A HRC 47 25 38 Apr 13 2021 hereinafter Khan 2021 Report ICCPR General comment No 34 Article 19 Freedoms of opinion and expression UN Doc CCPR C GC 34 12 Sept 12 2011 hereinafter GC 34 9 10 Id 50 11 Khan 2021 Report supra note 8 39 12 Id at 38 13 Id 14 Kaye 2018 Report supra note 3 15 mma Llans et al Artificial Intelligence Content Moderation and Freedom of ExE pression Transatlantic Working Group Feb 26 2020 https www ivir nl publicaties download AI Llanso Van Hoboken Feb 2020 pdf 16 S ee e g Giovanni De Gregorio Democratising online content moderation A constitutional framework 2020 https doi org 10 1016 j clsr 2019 105374 Sahana Udupa et al Artificial Intelligence Extreme Speech and the Challenges of Online Content Moderation 2021 AI4Dignity 17 UN Guiding Principles supra note 3 18 S ee e g Susan Benesch But Facebook s Not a Country How to Interpret Human Rights Law for Social Media Companies 38 86 Yale J on Reg Bulletin 86 92 2020 19 UN Guiding Principle 11 Business enterprises should respect human rights This means that they should avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved According to principle 12 this responsibility entails that businesses should at a minimum respect the International Bill of Rights consisting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights UN Guiding Principles supra note 3 Working Group Report supra note 4 at 13 43 The Working Group identified the following list of factors as relevant in enabling businesses to recognize when they are subject to this heightened responsibility the existence of an armed conflict or other forms of instability between States weakness or absence of State structures a State s record of serious violations of international human rights law and IHL the amassing of weapons or arms the imposition of emergency laws or other security measures the suspension of or interference with vital State institutions particularly if this results in the exclusion of vulnerable or minority groups increased politicization of identity increased inflammatory rhetoric or hate speech sustained signs of militia or paramilitary groups the strengthening of security apparatuses or mobilization against specific groups by States strict control or banning of communication channels and the expulsion or banning of civil society organizations the media and any other watchdogs Id at 16 21 Kaye 2018 Report supra note 3 31 32 ICCPR supra note 7 at art 20 2 The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ICERD contains a corresponding provision to Art 20 2 ICCPR in Article 4 but this report exclusively discusses the ICCPR because the ICCPR s hate speech provision is broader encompassing incitement to hostility or violence not just racial discrimination With that being said most if not all of the relevant considerations that apply to the relationship between Articles 19 and 20 2 ICCPR also apply with equal force to the relationship between Articles 19 ICCPR and Art 4 ICERD See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art 4 opened for signature Dec 21 1965 entered into force Jan 4 1969 33 UN Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech 2 June 18 2019 https www un org en genocideprevention documents advising and mobilizing Action_plan_on_hate_ speech_EN pdf hereinafter UN Hate Speech Strategy 2019 34 UNHCHR Rabat Plan of Action UN Doc A HRC 22 17 Add 4 29 Jan 11 2013 hereinafter Rabat Plan This test was originally adopted to assess expression that should be criminalized but has since been expanded Essentially the more severe the hate speech in question is under the Rabat test the more likely that restricting the hate speech will be necessary and proportionate under the third prong of the test in Article 19 3 ICCPR supra note 7 55

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35 36 59 Platform manipulation and spam policy Twitter Help Center Sept 2020 https help twitter com en rules and policies platform manipulation 60 Impersonation policy Twitter Help Center https help twitter com en rules and policies twitter impersonation policy 61 Synthetic and manipulated media policy Twitter Help Center https help twitter com en rules and policies manipulated media 62 Twitter enforcement philosophy supra note 40 S ee e g Khan 2021 Report supra note 8 see e g European Parliament The impact of disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in the world Apr 2021 https www europarl europa eu RegData etudes STUD 2021 653635 EXPO_STU 2021 653635_ EN pdf 63 Id 64 osce org mg Azerbaijan continues to contend that all of the territory gained during the war is Azerbaijani but under Armenian occupation See Gerard Toal and John O Loughlin Here are the 5 things you need to know about the deadly fighting in Nagorno Karabakh Wash Post Apr 16 2016 https www washingtonpost com news monkey cage wp 2016 04 06 will war erupt in nagorny karabakh here are the 5 things you need to know Since the 1994 Ceasefire there have been constant skirmishes along the Line of Contact including the Four Day War in 2016 and a conflict within the territory of Armenia along the Armenian Azerbaijani Border in July 2020 See e g Azerbaijan Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno Karabakh HRW Dec 1 1994 https www hrw org report 1994 12 01 seven years conflict nagorno karabakh Avet Demourian Armenia Azerbaijan border fighting escalates 16 killed Wash Post July 15 2020 https www washingtonpost com world europe correction armenia azerbaijan story 2020 07 15 d1606484 c6d7 11ea a8258722004e4150_story html ur range of enforcement options Twitter Help Center https help twitter com en O rules and policies enforcement options 65 Id 66 Corporate Human Rights Policy Facebook Mar 16 2021 https about fb com wp content uploads 2021 03 Facebooks Corporate Human Rights Policy pdf hereinafter Facebook Human Rights Policy 67 Id 68 Facebook Community Standards supra note 41 69 Id 70 Id 71 Violence and Incitement Facebook https www facebook com communitystandards credible_violence hereinafter Facebook Violence and Incitement 72 Dangerous Individuals and Organizations Facebook https www facebook com communitystandards dangerous_individuals_organizations hereinafter Facebook Dangerous Individuals and Organizations Policy 98 See e g Hugh Williamson Unlawful Attacks on Medical Facilities and Personnel in Nagorno Karabakh HRW Feb 26 2021 https www hrw org news 2021 02 26 unlawful attacks medical facilities and personnel nagorno karabakh 73 Coordinating Harm and Publicizing Crime Facebook https www facebook com communitystandards coordinating_harm_publicizing_crime 99 See e g Promise Institute for Human Rights Nagorno Karabakh Conflict Introduction https libguides law ucla edu NagornoKarabakhConflict 74 Facebook Dangerous Individuals and Organizations Policy supra note 72 100 75 Facebook Violence and Incitement supra note 71 76 Hate Speech Facebook https www facebook com communitystandards hate_speech 77 Violent and Graphic Content Facebook https www facebook com communitystandards graphic_violence 78 Facebook Community Standards supra note 40 79 Account Integrity and Authentic Identity Facebook https www facebook com communitystandards misrepresentation 80 False News Facebook https www facebook com communitystandards false_news 81 Manipulated Media Facebook https www facebook com communitystandards manipulated_media 82 am Shead Facebook owns the four most downloaded apps of the decade BBC Dec 18 S 2019 https www bbc com news technology 50838013 83 Facebook Human Rights Policy supra note 66 84 Instagram Community Guidelines supra note 40 85 Reducing the Spread of False Information on Instagram Instagram Help Center https help instagram com 1735798276553028 86 Third Committee proceedings supra note 31 2 See also Kearney supra note 28 at 132 87 Khan 2021 Report supra note 8 at 38 VK Safety Guidelines supra note 40 88 GC 34 supra note 9 at 22 45 See Platform Standards VK https m vk com safety lang en section standards 89 Id at 25 46 Id 90 See Kaye 2018 Report supra note 3 at 46 47 Id 91 GC 34 supra note 9 at 22 48 VK Terms of Service supra note 44 92 Id at 33 34 49 Twitter enforcement philosophy supra note 43 93 Working Group Report supra note 4 at 46 48 50 Id 94 51 he Twitter Rules Twitter Help Center https help twitter com en rules and policies twitT ter rules hereinafter Twitter Rules Neither side accepts responsibility for striking first HRW wrote that September 27 Azerbaijan launched a military offensive that escalated hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the de facto authorities in Nagorno Karabakh Azerbaijan Events of 2020 HRW https www hrw org world report 2021 country chapters azerbaijan 37 See e g Khan 2021 Report supra note 8 at 1 The Digital Culture Media and Sport Committee Disinformation and fake news Interim Report Government Response to the Committee s Fifth Report of Session 2017 19 2 Oct 23 2018 https publications parliament uk pa cm201719 cmselect cmcumeds 1630 1630 pdf Veridiana Alimonti EFF to the inter American System If You Want to Tackle Fake News Consider Free Expression First EFF Feb 28 2019 https www eff org deeplinks 2019 02 eff inter americansystem if you want tackle fake news think free expression first Darrin Baines Robert J R Elliott Defining misinformation disinformation and malinformation An urgent need for clarity during COVID 19 infodemic 16 Apr 21 2020 http www repec bham ac uk pdf 20 06 pdf Joshua A Tucker et al Social Media Political Polarization and Political Disinformation A Review of the Scientific Literature 55 Mar 2018 https www hewlett org wp content uploads 2018 03 Social Media Political Polarization and Political Disinformation Literature Review pdf 38 Khan 2021 Report supra note 8 at 38 39 Statement by Irene Khan Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the freedom of opinion and expression to the 47th Session of the Human Rights Council Jul 2 2021 https www ohchr org en press briefing notes 2021 07 statement irene khan special rapporteur promotion and protection 40 41 42 43 44 S ee e g Our approach to policy development and enforcement philosophy Twitter Help Center https help twitter com en rules and policies enforcement philosophy hereinafter Twitter enforcement philosophy Community Standards Facebook https www facebook com communitystandards hereinafter Facebook Community Standards Community Guidelines Instagram Help Center https help instagram com 477434105621119 hereinafter Instagram Community Guidelines Safety Guidelines VK https m vk com safety section social lang en hereinafter VK Safety Guidelines ase Decision 2020 006 FB FBR Facebook Oversight Board 2021 https www overC sightboard com decision FB XWJQBU9A If not listed under their Community Standards or Community Guidelines respectively then Facebook and Instagram s policies can be found on Facebook s Newsroom I t should be noted that some platforms do not make their policy changes easily searchable and so in some instances we were unable to find information regarding modifications that may have been made between November 2020 and August 2021 We were able to track some changes to the platform policies using the Wayback Machine https archive org archive today https archive ph and Letter Girl https letrachica digital However The Wayback Machine cannot archive Facebook and Instagram sites and VK s platform policies have not been archived there Terms of Service VK 8 5 last updated May 21 2018 https vk com terms hereinafter VK Terms of Service See also VK Safety Guidelines supra note 40 52 Id 53 iolent threats policy Twitter Help Center Mar 2019 https help twitter com en V rules and policies violent threats glorification 54 55 56 Another view propounded by the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media is that freedom of expression under the ICCPR should be interpreted as not including war propaganda and hate speech According to this view restrictions on propaganda for war or hate speech would not need to satisfy the tripartite test in Article 19 3 See OSCE 2015 Report supra note 28 This parallels how the European Court of Human Rights ECtHR sometimes treats hate speech See e g Ethan Shattock Should the ECtHR Invoke Article 17 for Disinformation Cases EJIL Talk Mar 26 2021 https www ejiltalk org should the ecthr invoke article 17 for disinformation cases Glorification of violence policy Twitter Help Center Mar 2019 https help twitter com en rules and policies glorification of violence Abusive behavior policy Twitter Help Center https help twitter com en rules and policies abusive behavior 56 H ateful conduct policy Twitter Help Center https help twitter com en rules and policies hateful conduct policy 57 S ensitive media policy Twitter Help Center Nov 2019 https help twitter com en rules and policies media policy 58 Twitter Rules supra note 52 95 96 Todd Carney Applying International Law to the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict Opinio Juris Jan 1 2020 http opiniojuris org 2020 01 22 applying international law to the nagorno karabakh conflict Beginning in 1988 there was high tension and later guerilla warfare Then in 1992 the fullscale war began See Nagorno Karabakh Conflict Council on Foreign Relations https www cfr org global conflict tracker conflict nagorno karabakh conflict By the time the war concluded with a Ceasefire Agreement in 1994 Armenia had full control of the land that was historically Artsakh as well as some of the surrounding Azerbaijani territories See The Nagorno Karabakh Conflict A Visual Explainer Crisis Group https www crisisgroup org content nagorno karabakh conflict visual explainer Yet negotiations run by the OSCE Minsk Group have failed to establish a Peace Treaty The OSCE Minsk Group spearheads the OSCE s efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict France Russia and the United States are co chairs See OSCE Minsk Group OSCE https www 97 See e g Azerbaijan Unlawful Strikes in Nagorno Karabakh HRW Dec 11 2020 https www hrw org news 2020 12 11 azerbaijan unlawful strikes nagorno karabakh Armenia Unlawful Rocket Missile Strikes on Azerbaijan HRW Dec 11 2020 https www hrw org news 2020 12 11 armenia unlawful rocket missile strikes azerbaijan Azerbaijan Attack on Church Possible War Crime HRW Dec 16 2020 https www hrw org news 2020 12 16 azerbaijan attack church possible war crime Azerbaijan Armenia Scores of civilians killed by indiscriminate use of weapons in conflict over Nagorno Karabakh Amnesty Int l Jan 14 2021 https www amnesty org en latest news 2021 01 azerbaijanarmenia scores of civilians killed by indiscriminate use of weapons in conflict over nagorno karabakh 101 See e g Azerbaijan Cluster Munitions Used in Nagorno Karabakh Oct 23 2020 https www hrw org news 2020 10 23 azerbaijan cluster munitions used nagorno karabakh Armenia Cluster Munitions Used in Multiple Attacks on Azerbaijan Dec 15 2020 https www hrw org news 2020 12 15 armenia cluster munitions used multiple attacks azerbaijan Azerbaijan It was also alleged that Azerbaijan used white phosphorus a banned substance See e g Satellite imagery shows environmental damage of reported white phosphorus use in Nagorno Karabakh Atlantic Council Digital Forensic Research Lab Nov 12 2020 https medium com dfrlab satellite imagery shows environmental damage of reported white phosphorus use in nagorno karabakh 9826391a295 See e g Azerbaijan Armenian Prisoners of War Badly Mistreated HRW Dec 2 2020 https www hrw org news 2020 12 02 azerbaijan armenian prisoners war badly mistreated Survivors of unlawful detention in Nagorno Karabakh speak out about war crimes HRW Mar 12 2021 https www hrw org news 2021 03 12 survivors unlawful detention nagorno karabakh speak out about war crime Azerbaijan Armenian POW s Abused in Custody HRW Mar 19 2021 https www hrw org news 2021 03 19 azerbaijan armenian pows abused custody 102 Armenia Azerbaijan and Russia sign Nagorno Karabakh peace deal BBC Nov 10 2020 https www bbc com news world europe 54882564 103 See e g Freedom on the Net 2021 Azerbaijan Freedom House https freedomhouse org country azerbaijan freedom net 2021 Katy Pearce While Armenia and Azerbaijan fought over Nagorno Karabakh their citizens battled on social media Wash Post Dec 4 2020 7 45 AM https www washingtonpost com politics 2020 12 04 while armenia azerbaijan fought over nagorno karabakh their citizens battled social media 104 Id 105 Media and disinformation in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict and their role in conflict resolution and peacebuilding College of Europe 9 Jan 2021 at p 9 https www2 coleurope eu system tdf uploads news event_report_ _media_and_disinformation_in_the_ nagorno karabakh_conflict pdf file 1 type node id draft force hereinafter College of Europe Report 106 Id 107 October 2020 Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior Report About Facebook Oct 2020 https about fb com wp content uploads 2020 11 October 2020 CIB Report pdf Coordinated inauthentic behavior CIB consists of coordinated efforts to manipulate public debate for a strategic goal where fake accounts are central to the operation CIB can occur in the context of domestic non government campaigns or on behalf of a foreign or government actor The accounts and pages that were removed by Facebook were all linked to the Youth Union of New Azerbaijani Party 108 S ee e g Sabina Garahan False Equivalences in the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict International Humanitarian and Criminal Law Perspectives Opinio Juris Feb 2 2021 http opiniojuris org 2021 02 10 false equivalences in the nagorno karabakh conflict international humanitarian and criminal law perspectives Carlotta Gall In Azerbaijan a String of Explosions Screams and Then Blood The N Y Times Oct 29 2020 https www nytimes com 2020 10 28 world europe azerbaijan barda armenia rockets karabakh html Shushan Stepanyan ShStepanyan TWITTER Oct 27 2020 10 33 AM https twitter com ShStepanyan status 1321097672711950337 https web archive org web 20201027143534 https twitter com ShStepanyan status 1321097672711950337 109 Arshaluys Barseghyan et al Disinformation and Misinformation in Armenia Confronting the Power of False Narratives Freedom House 18 June 2021 https freedomhouse org sites default files 2021 06 Disinformation in Armenia_En v3 pdf 110 Id at p 18 111 College of Europe Report supra note 106 112 See e g Twitter Oct 25 2020 11 16 AM https twitter com Gunel99M status 1320383678011314176 https web archive org web 20201027054507 https twitter com Gunel99M status 1320383678011314176 INSTAGRAM Oct 28 2020 4 31 AM https www instagram com p CG4W9pVFGT0 Hikmet Hajiyev HikmetHajiyev Twitter Oct 24 2020 2 01 PM https mobile twitter com HikmetHajiyev status 1320062999453929474 https web archive org web 20201024180400 https twitter com HikmetHajiyev status 1320062999453929474 113 See e g Twitter Oct 2 2020 7 57 PM https twitter com mert___3434 status 1312179941060956161 Ali Alizada Ali_F_Alizada Twitter Oct 2 2020 1 54 AM https twitter com Ali_F_Alizada status 1311907438434619394 https www instagram com p CFz3ATel1iQ https web archive org web 20201007061159 https twitter com Ali_F_Alizada status 1311907438434619394 It has been reported that Syrian mercenaries were deployed to Azerbaijan while claims about foreign mercenaries in Armenia either remain contested or have been debunked See e g Bethan McKernan Syrian rebel fighters prepare to deploy to Azerbaijan in sign of Turkey s ambition The Guardian Sept 28 2020 2 13 PM https www theguardian com world 2020 sep 28 syrian rebelfighters prepare to deploy to azerbaijan in sign of turkeys ambition Karine Ghazaryan Wagner Affiliated Telegram Channel Trolls Nagorno Karabakh Conflict Analysts Bellingcat Oct 7 2020 https www bellingcat com news uk and europe 2020 10 07 wagner affiliated channel trolls nagorno karabakh conflict analysts 114 Freedom on the Net 2021 Azerbaijan Freedom House https freedomhouse org country azerbaijan freedom net 2021 115 See e g Hikmet Hajiyev HikmetHajiyev Twitter Feb 17 2020 12 53 PM https twitter com HikmetHajiyev status 1229463798853050370 s 20 https web archive org web 20200217175515 https twitter com HikmetHajiyev status 1229463798853050370 See e g Case decision 2020 003 FB UA Facebook Oversight Board 2021 https oversightboard com decision FB QBJDASCV 116 This process was conducted in early 2020 at which point we identified 40 hashtags and an additional 30 search terms events and dates that were commonly being used across different platforms 117 It should be noted that in recent years Facebook has implemented significant modifications to its platform in an effort to clamp down on coordinated behavior and inauthentic accounts rendering it extremely difficult for researchers to conduct investigations on the platform Our team encountered numerous problems in using Facebook during our research which prevented us from gauging the full scope of the type of content that was circulating prior to and during the conflict on that platform 118 See e g Case decision 2021 008 FB FBR Facebook Oversight Board 2021 https oversightboard com decision FB B6NGYREK hereinafter Oversight Board Brazil COVID 19 decision 119 Interview Exclusive ORDU AZ July 9 2019 12 58 AM https ordu az az news 151791 radius artiq unikal ve tekrari olmayan bir mehsul kimi efirde oz yerini berkidib musahibe ekskluziv 120 Manana Hakobyan et al 2020 Armenia Azerbaijan Twitter War An Investigation of Patriotic Astroturfing during the 2020 Armenia Azerbaijan War DataPoint Armenia 1 33 34 2021 https datapoint am dziv hereinafter Astroturfing Report 121 Hans Kloss is the code name of the Soviet agent protagonist in the World War II set Polish television series Stawka wi ksza ni ycie Additionally Zahid Abdulov a victim of the Khojaly killings was known by the nickname Hans Kloss which may have served as inspiration for its use here or is a reflection of the popularity of the Polish show in Azerbaijan See IMDB Stawka wi ksza ni ycie https www imdb com title tt0065035 ref_ nm_ knf_t2 Sariyya Muslumgizi Guest from Khojaly 249 250 Adila Agabeyli Taleh Bulud trans Mammad Nazimoghlu Asly Khalilgizi eds 2008 122 Polygon Azerbaijan VK https vk com polygon_az http web archive org web 20210925204055 https vk com polygon_az 123 PLGN Azerbaijan YouTube https www youtube com channel UCKDgCSbPv6Gg4V0e290MGSg http web archive org web 20210925204308 https www youtube com channel UCKDgCSbPv6Gg4V0e290MGSg 124 Polygon Azerbaijan Facebook https www facebook com polygon azerbaijan 125 World Intellectual Property Organization WIPO https www3 wipo int branddb en 57

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126 127 128 S ee Heydar Mirza LinkedIn https az linkedin com in heydar mirza 552a1088 see also Jeffrey Mankoff Iran Azerbaijan Relations and Strategic Competition in the Caucasus CSIS Presents Apr il 29 2013 https www csis org events iran azerbaijan relations and strategic competition caucasus aliber az https caliber az http web archive org web 20210925204753 https caliber C az Caliber az YouTube https www youtube com c CaliberAz http web archive org web 20201112223356 https www youtube com c CaliberAz ADIUS Facebook https www facebook com itvradius RADIUS YouTube https www R youtube com playlist list PLmBIdPJozgD4GTgQUKFyjUG6lwA_9_F99 http web archive org web 20210925204957 https www youtube com playlist list PLmBIdPJozgD4GTgQUKFyjUG6lwA_9_F99 Referring to Armenians as vermin or a species of vermin was and is a theme in Azerbaijani online rhetoric and has even been used by such official sources as the President of Azerbaijan See Joe Nerssessian The Mixed Messaging of Ilham Aliyev EVN Report Oct 22 2020 https www evnreport com politics the mixed messaging of ilham aliyev 153 Id at 6 3 4d 154 Id at 6 3 4e 155 Id at 6 3 4f Armenian Occupation Watch ArmenOccupWatch Twitter Oct 7 2020 12 23 PM https twitter com ArmenOccupWatch status 1313877651682189314 https web archive org web 20201007170332 https twitter com ArmenOccupWatch status 1313877651682189314 156 Id at 6 3 4k see also section 6 Obligations of the User 157 VK Safety Guidelines Platform Standards supra note 40 158 Id 159 Id 160 Id 161 Evidence of malicious intent includes 1 animosity based on certain characteristics or differences 2 offensive behavior contempt toward other people s values or views or 3 expression of personal superiority accompanied by a baseless and unfair attitude toward a specific individual or group of people See VK Safety Guidelines supra note 40 191 162 Id Id 192 Id 129 189 Twitter Oct 9 2020 https twitter com shahlam_ status 1314461514913456130 https web archive org web 20201009070403 https twitter com shahlam_ status 1314461514913456130 190 S ynthetic and Manipulated Media Policy Twitter Wayback Machine Sept 27 2020 https web archive org web 20200927194248 https help twitter com en rules and policies manipulated media hereinafter Twitter Synthetic and Manipulated Media Policy Sept 2020 Synthetic and Manipulated Media Policy Twitter Wayback Machine Nov 13 2020 https web archive org web 20201113023157 https help twitter com en rules and policies manipulated media hereinafter Twitter Synthetic and Manipulated Media Policy Nov 2020 226 Telegram Karabakh is Azerbaijan https t me KarabakhisAZE 227 ouTube Karabakh is Azerbaijan https www youtube com c KarabakhisAzerbaijanMedia Y about 228 Baku Engineering University https beu edu az en page bmu haqqinda 64 229 Instagram Oct 3 2020 11 35 AM https www instagram com p CF4vdvlA4Ja 230 Hraparak TV Azeris spread false information using the name Hraparak Hraparak am Sept 27 2020 https hraparak am post 24a00c25aeae34e397654e676d76a3b2 Warning that the account operated by hraparak_tv is fake designed to look like the official Instagram account that belongs to the actual Hraparak TV media outlet This article is originally in Armenian but was translated using Google Translate 231 YouTube Oct 2 2020 3 13 AM https www youtube com watch app desktop v LvoiKZuDgIA 232 Twitter Oct 1 2020 1 56 PM https twitter com africaken1 status 1311726589542117376 https web archive org web 20201003000652 https twitter com africaken1 status 1311726589542117376 233 S ee YouTube Oct 1 2020 6 51 AM https www youtube com watch v AK lOqmIoCk https web archive org web 20201107155534 https www youtube com watch v AK lOqmIoCk t 2s 130 Google Translate https translate google com 163 Id 193 Yandex Translate https translate yandex com 164 Id Id 131 194 olygon Azerbaijan VK July 2 2020 9 17 PM https vk com wall 66054882_46499 P http web archive org web 20210925205332 https vk com wall 66054882_46499 165 UN Guiding Principles supra note 3 Id 132 195 166 GC 34 supra note 9 Id olygon Azerbaijan VK Oct 11 2020 5 19 AM https vk com wall 66054882_56010 P http web archive org web 20210916163036 https vk com wall 66054882_56010 196 167 UN Hate Speech Strategy supra note 34 Id 234 133 Instagram Oct 3 2020 11 35 AM https www instagram com p CF4vdvlA4Ja 197 235 168 134 olygon Azerbaijan VK Oct 18 2020 11 10 PM https vk com wall 66054882_56851 P http web archive org web 20210925210430 https vk com wall 66054882_56851 ICCPR supra note 7 Id 198 169 VK Safety Guidelines supra note 41 Id 199 Id Id he Azerbaijani government claimed military breakthroughs in the Fuzuli region on the night T of October 17 2020 and many resulting Armenian casualties see Defense Ministry Azerbaijan Army troops managed to move forward in various directions of front AZERTAC Oct 17 2020 11 59 PM https azertag az en xeber Defense_Ministry_Azerbaijan_Army_troops_ managed_to_move_forward_in_various_directions_of_front 1616417 170 135 200 171 ICCPR supra note 7 Id 201 172 Rabat Plan supra note 35 at 29 Twitter Synthetic and Manipulated Media Policy supra note 190 S ee e g Another trick of Armenians Milli Az Oct 2 2020 https news milli az politics 886026 html translated using Google Translate Armenians also involved civilians in fighting 525 az Oct 2 2020 https 525 az name xeber news_id 150938 translated using Google Translate Trend Armenia involving civilians in combat operations against Azerbaijan AzerNews Oct 2 2020 https www azernews az aggression 169840 html translated using Google Translate 202 Id at 29 Khan 2021 Report supra note 8 at 42 236 173 203 S ee Facebook Violence and Incitement Policy Sept 2020 supra note 216 Facebook Violence and Incitement Policy Nov 2020 supra note 216 174 See e g Case decision 2021 001 FB FBR Facebook Oversight Board 2021 https www oversightboard com sr decision 2021 001 pdf english witter Synthetic and Manipulated Media Policy Sept 2020 supra note 190 Twitter SynthetT ic and Manipulated Media Policy Nov 2020 supra note 190 237 Id 204 acebook Armenia Artsakh Awareness Center https www facebook com armenianawareF ness posts 133866341822107 238 205 ArmeniaFund About Armenia Fund https www armeniafund org about 206 Armenia Azerbaijan Decapitation and war crimes in gruesome videos must be urgently investigated Amnesty International Dec 10 2020 https www amnesty org en latest news 2020 12 armenia azerbaijan decapitation and war crimes in gruesome videos must be urgently investigated hereinafter Amnesty Decapitation Report S ee An Update to How We Address Movements and Organizations Tied to Violence About Facebook Aug 19 2020 https about fb com news 2020 08 addressing movements and organizations tied to violence last updated Jan 19 2021 hereinafter FB policy update 239 H ard Questions What s Facebook s Strategy for Stopping False News Wayback Machine Aug 16 2020 https web archive org web 20200816052419 https about fb com news 2018 05 hard questions false news 207 Id 240 See e g Oversight Board Brazil COVID 19 decision supra note 119 208 witter Nov 4 2020 5 37 PM https twitter com Jake_Hanrahan staT tus 1324118526551117826 https web archive org web 20201104223830 https twitter com Jake_Hanrahan status 1324118526551117826 241 C f Case Decision 2020 003 FB UA Facebook Oversight Board 2021 https oversightboard com decision FB QBJDASCV 242 Khan 2021 Report supra note 8 at 42 209 Amnesty Decapitation Report supra note 206 243 210 iolent and Graphic Content Transparency Center Aug 27 2020 https transparency V fb com policies community standards violent graphic content hereinafter Facebook Violent and Graphic Policy Aug 2020 Violent and Graphic Content Transparency Center Nov 18 2020 https transparency fb com policies community standards violent graphic content hereinafter Facebook Violent and Graphic Policy Nov 2020 Facebook Violence and Incitement Policy Sept 2020 supra note 216 Facebook Violence and Incitement Policy Nov 2020 supra note 216 argarita Achikyan Armenian Noses YouTube Dec 22 2014 https www youtube com M watch v Nb42OAtBpM8 Emil Babayan Everybody nose the Armenian feature you simply can t avoid The Calvert Journal Jan 25 2016 https www calvertjournal com articles show 5321 armenian nose national symbol rhinoplasty yerevan 175 137 on Harr n The Jewish nose in early modern art and music 28 Renaissance Stud 50 50 D 2014 https doi org 10 1111 rest 12006 176 138 olygon Azerbaijan VK Dec 29 2020 1 20 AM https vk com wall 66054882_59773 P http web archive org web 20210925211548 https vk com wall 66054882_59773 In public speeches Aliyev has described Armenians as vermin See Joe Nerssessian The Mixed Messaging of Ilham Aliyev EVN Report Oct 22 2020 https www evnreport com politics the mixed messaging of ilham aliyev 177 139 agik Shamshyan Tragic car accident in Syunik region Mitsubishi crashed into the abyss G about 400 meters appearing in the Varkarn River The dead are employees of the RA Ministry of Defense PHOTO REPORT Shamshyan com Dec 29 2020 9 56 AM https shamshyan com hy article 2020 12 29 1174823 See e g Caliber az YouTube IDEF 21 August 26 2021 https www youtube com watch v jq5U3Ws82PE Polygon Azerbaijan VK Aug 27 2020 7 28 PM https vk com wall 66054882_51646 http web archive org web 20210929005204 https vk com wall 66054882_51646 136 140 141 142 178 Aisha Jabbarova President Aliyev inaugurates Military Trophy Park in Baku Azeri Times 2021 https azeritimes com 2021 04 12 president aliyev inaugurates military trophy park in baku See e g Military Az Forum https www military az com forum viewtopic php t 2085 start 210 olygon Azerbaijan VK Mar 23 2021 4 15 AM https vk com wall 66054882_61313 P http web archive org web 20210925213710 https vk com wall 66054882_61313 179 O ne of the missing servicemen found dead MoD Panorama am Mar 23 2021 1 38 AM https www panorama am en news 2021 03 23 missing servicemen Jermuk 2473604 nited Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner One pager on incitement to U hatred https www ohchr org sites default files Rabat_threshold_test pdf 180 K is the most popular social media network in Azerbaijan and has 100 million global V monthly users Vincenzo Cosenza The map of social networks in the world January 2021 Vincos Blog Jan 19 2021 https vincos it 2021 01 19 la mappa dei social network nelmondo gennaio 2021 The Battle of Zangezeur 1918 1921 is remembered as a critical victory over Soviet forces which preserved Armenian cultural and ethnic heritage See Tsovinar Petrosyan Zangezur The Battle for the Right to Remain Armenians 1918 1921 Art A Tsolum Apr 21 2019 https allinnet info history zangezur the battle 143 S ee e g Twitter https twitter com ScourgeOfTengri status 1397288588191178753 http web archive org web 20210925214033 https twitter com ScourgeOfTengri status 1397288588191178753 144 S ee e g Military Az Forum https www military az com forum viewtopic php t 2085 start 210 http web archive org web 20210926041124 https www military az com forum viewtopic php t 2085 start 210 145 58 188 S ee e g Defence Az Azerbaijan Army eliminate commander of tank battalion of Armenia Oct 05 2020 14 37 https bit ly 3BEaFqw http web archive org web 20210926041244 https defence az en news 146289 azerbaijan army eliminated commander of tank battalion of armenia 146 A rmenia seeks Russian forces on Azerbaijan border amid tensions Al Jazeera July 29 2021 https www aljazeera com news 2021 7 29 armenia seeks russian forces on azerbaijan border amid tensions 147 ctimai Television RADIUS https itv az tvshows 6 148 I nterview Exclusive ORDU AZ July 9 2019 12 58 AM https ordu az az news 151791 radius artiq unikal ve tekrari olmayan bir mehsul kimi efirde oz yerini berkidib musahibe ekskluziv 149 See Heydar Mirza LinkedIn https az linkedin com in heydar mirza 552a1088 150 Caliber az YOUTUBE Mar 17 2021 https www youtube com watch v REKYTv9Isss http web archive org web 20210926041901 https www youtube com watch v REKYTv9Isss Caliber az YouTube Mar 23 2021 https www youtube com watch v CC81iW_ZVrQ http web archive org web 20210926041945 https www youtube com watch v CC81iW_ZVrQ 151 VK Terms of Service supra note 43 152 Id at 6 3 4a 181 S ee e g Defence Az Azerbaijan Army eliminate commander of tank battalion of Armenia Oct 05 2020 14 37 https bit ly 3BEaFqw http web archive org web 20210926041244 https defence az en news 146289 azerbaijan army eliminated commander of tank battalion of armenia 182 S ee e g A shot News 2 VK March 23 2021 https vk com wall 169586838_6126 http web archive org web 20210929010227 https vk com wall 169586838_6126 183 See e g Twitter https twitter com ScourgeOfTengri status 1397288588191178753 http web archive org web 20210925214033 https twitter com ScourgeOfTengri status 1397288588191178753 184 See e g Military Az Forum https www military az com forum viewtopic php t 2085 start 210 http web archive org web 20210926041124 https www military az com forum viewtopic php t 2085 start 2 185 Their most recent video was posted Sept 24 2021 Caliber az YouTube 2 Sept 24 2021 https www youtube com watch v ir7 _wK2RHI 186 arratives employed in the Rwandan genocide include employing dehumanizing language N fear mongering messages of inherent inferiority or superiority encourage a lack of empathy and expressions of visceral scorn See The Prosecutor v Ferdinand Nahimana Jean Bosco Baryagwiza and Hasan Ngeze Case No ICTR 99 52 T Int l Crim Trib for Rwanda December 3 2003 187 S ee e g Hikmet Hajiyev Assistant of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Head of Foreign Policy Affairs Department of the Presidential Administration HikmetHajiyev Twitter Oct 11 2020 1 24 AM https twitter com HikmetHajiyev status 1315161389372243968 https web archive org web 20201011062912 https twitter com HikmetHajiyev status 1315161389372243968 Hikmet Hajiyev HikmetHajiyev Twitter July 4 2020 10 00 AM https twitter com HikmetHajiyev status 1279414780382633986 https web archive org web 20200704141331 https twitter com HikmetHajiyev status 1279414780382633986 211 Facebook False News https transparency fb com policies community standards falsenews 244 245 Instagram does not provide information on whether a user s account was suspended in the past However it is clear that KIAz s account was not suspended during the conflict because content was posted to their account several times a day on almost every single day of the conflict which would not have been possible if their account had been suspended for a short duration Also an archive on the Wayback Machine from November 6 2020 reveals that the account was still fully operational at that time See Wayback Machine Nov 6 2020 https web archive org web 20201106072556 https www instagram com karabakhisazerbaijann_ This aligns with the responsibility to respect approach advocated by former Former UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression David Kaye See e g Kaye 2018 Report supra note 3 1 Id 212 Id 213 Id 214 Facebook Violent and Graphic Content Policy Sept 2020 supra note 210 Facebook Violent and Graphic Content POlicy Nov 2020 supra note 210 246 215 S ee An Update to How We Address Movements and Organizations Tied to Violence About Facebook Aug 19 2020 https about fb com news 2020 08 addressing movements and organizations tied to violence 247 S ee Violence and Incitement Transparency Center Sept 3 2020 https transparency fb com policies community standards violence incitement hereinafter Facebook Violence and Incitement Policy Sept 2020 Violence and Incitement Transparency Center Nov 18 2020 https transparency fb com policies community standards violence incitement hereinafter Facebook Violence and Incitement Policy Nov 2020 GC 34 supra note 9 25 216 248 Id 249 In particular Facebook and Instagrams policies are scattered throughout their Terms of Service and elsewhere including blog posts The Facebook Oversight Board has held that this should be addressed See e g Case Decision 2020 006 FB FBR Facebook Oversight Board 2021 https www oversightboard com decision FB XWJQBU9A If not listed under their Community Standards or Community Guidelines respectively then Facebook and Instagram s policies can be found on Facebook s Newsroom 217 Cf Case Decision 2020 003 FB UA Facebook Oversight Board 2021 https oversightboard com decision FB QBJDASCV 218 Facebook Violence and Incitement Policy Sept 2020 supra note 216 Facebook Violence and Incitement Policy Nov 2020 supra note 216 219 See e g Oversight Board Brazil COVID 19 decision supra note 119 Case Decision 2020 006 FB FBR Facebook Oversight Board 2021 https oversightboard com decision FB XWJQBU9A 250 GC 34 supra note 9 at 33 34 251 Working Group supra note 4 252 Id at 46 253 Id at 47 220 Id 254 See e g Astroturfing Report supra note 120 Id at 48 221 255 222 Instagram Karabakh is Azerbaijan https www instagram com karabakhisazerbaijann_ Id at 65 256 Id at 64 257 Id at 65 223 Facebook Karabakh is Azerbaijan https www facebook com karabakhisazerbaijanmedia 224 Twitter Karabakh is Azerbaijan https twitter com karabakh_isaze lang en 225 YouTube Karabakh is Azerbaijan https www youtube com c KarabakhisAzerbaijanMedia about 59

Social Media, Content Moderation & Int'l Human Rights Law

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