IGGY THE DWARF THE ONTOLOGY OF H : simplebooklet.com

R a m s e y | A N O N T O L O G Y O F S H A P E S H I F T E R S | P a g e | iii INTRODUCTION Linnaeus’s ‘External Man’ is neither a human being in the mammalian family nor a true offspring of humans, but in our times, those people in the world are known to be people in general. In the philosophy of being, making an ontological distinction by applying categories of being, which in theory concerns genera and kinds of entities1, will determine the widest and most fundamental class to which ‘Homo Exterior’ belong. Firstly, the shapeshifters will be grouped into a common ontological system of categories of being which include substances, properties, relations, states of affairs, and events. Secondly, the degree to which fundamental ontological concepts including particularity and universality, abstractness and concreteness, ontological dependence, identity, modality, properties and relations, and the reality of things, concerns the categories of being of ‘Homo Exterior,’ or shapeshifters, shall be discussed. Finally, a brief history of the categories of being shall be examined to welcome constructive criticism, of the ontological distinction applied to this work, as a beginning toward a true Linnaean classification of the misleading genus and species presently known as ‘Homo Exterior.’ However, some words about modality and the question of whether ‘Homo Exterior’ is a necessary or contingent being are useful since that issue has been held by some philosophers as the highest division of being2. Contingent beings are beings whose existence is possible but not necessary, and necessary beings, on the other hand, could not have failed to exist. Despite 1 2

Page 4

R a m s e y | A N O N T O L O G Y O F S H A P E S H I F T E R S | P a g e | iv speculations that there are shapeshifters in the world such as David Icke discerns, and at least one suggestion that the Klingon language is not a mechanical language in the field of linguistics, rather a natural language, nor of the fictitious Klingons, rather more likely spoken and written widely among ‘Homo Exterior,’ there are as yet not sufficient observations with which to prove an hypothesis which might lead to a theory that the shapeshifters are necessary beings, and could not have failed to exist. Subsequently ‘Homo Exterior’ are contingent beings, whose existence is possible but not necessary, as possibly being extraterrestrials from outside our solar system who did not dwell on Earth before the mid to late twentieth-century, the last one to five decades prior to the end of the second millennium, and that they continue to populate the planet in numbers whose magnitude remains guesswork at this time.

Page 5

R a m s e y | A N O N T O L O G Y O F S H A P E S H I F T E R S P a g e | 5 CHAPTER ONE: THE SUBSTANCE OF SHAPESHIFTERS The beings called ‘Homo Exterior’ are extracted from a substance. Their properties are derived from that substance, but they are distinct from it. Subsequently, the shapeshifters so named ‘Homo Exterior’ are substrata, or like Kant’s thing-in-itself: And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing-in-itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something. — Prolegomena, 323 Substances are particulars that are ontologically independent, existing all by themselves. They are concrete, spatiotemporal entities. Attributes or properties are borne of substances and show what the substance is like. Moreover, substances can undergo change. Substances existing before, during, or after change, are described as persisting substances which gain or lose properties because of that change. In contrast, universals are what particulars of properties have in common, namely characteristics or qualities. In other words, universals recur in many particulars, like the colour of green, which is to say that greenness is a universal characteristic or quality of the attributes or properties, for example of unripe bananas and a green bicycle. Substances are classified into monist, dualist, or pluralist varieties, according to how many are said to populate the world. In the monistic view of Stoicism, there is only one substance called pneuma or God. Cartesian dualism recognizes two substances: mind and matter. 3

Page 6

R a m s e y | A N O N T O L O G Y O F S H A P E S H I F T E R S | P a g e | 6 Pluralist philosophies of substances include Plato’s Theory of Forms and Aristotle’s hylomorphic categories. THE STOIC VIEW Pneuma is the soul of Zues (God) and makes the human soul (psyche). It is the active, generative principle that organizes both the individual and the cosmos. It structures matter and is being in inanimate objects. Pneuma has been described as the “breath of life,” which is formed of the element of air that is in movement, or wind, and which is mixed with the element of fire, as it pertains to warmth. The three kinds of pneuma depend on their proportion of fire and air. The first kind of pneuma is tonos, which supplies cohesion or hexis to things, and which is being in inanimate objects. The second kind of pneuma is a life force which gives physis to the attributes or properties of substance, which enables growth and characterizes them as alive. The third kind of pneuma, in its most rarified and fiery form, is the soul or psyche. It pervades the living body, governs its motion, and conveys the powers of perception and reproduction. The rational soul or logica psyche, which grants the force of judgement to a mature human being is sometimes called the fourth grade or kind of pneuma. Thus, pneuma is the active generative principle that organizes, not only the cosmos, but also the beings of ‘Homo Exterior.’ Their tonos supplies their hexis or cohesion as those beings. Yet, since ‘Homo Exterior’ are shapeshifters, and not always human beings, they necessarily exist in a plurality of hexes. Moreover, while it is necessary that the life force pneuma gives them physis, which enables their growth, and makes them alive, their psyche or soul which governs

Page 7

R a m s e y | A N O N T O L O G Y O F S H A P E S H I F T E R S | P a g e | 7 their motion and conveys to the shapeshifters the powers of perception and reproduction, is necessarily different in genera and kind of entities since they are ‘External Man’ and only resemble the genus homo. Neither are they homo sapiens, nor are they of familia mammalia. Likewise, their force of judgement, or logica psyche is different from individual mature human beings since they are beings of ‘Homo Exterior,’ and it is such as that of beings who are shapeshifters. Yet, they are pneuma. Their attributes or properties express what pneuma is like; their universals recur as characteristics or qualities in common with other beings, such as the attributes or properties of human beings, and those of inanimate objects in the cosmos, in which pneuma is present. That is because pneuma as the soul of Zues (God) is the generative principle or “breath of life” which organizes the individual and the cosmos, structures matter, and is being in inanimate objects. CARTESIAN DUALISM Ontological dualism as it relates to substance, asserts that mind and matter are the two distinct foundations of being. It is the Cartesian belief that what is mental can exist outside the body, but that the body cannot think. The mind-body problem is a philosophical concern of mental states of the mind and physical states of the body. For example, feelings of sadness in the mind cause people to cry. Similarly, changes in the body’s chemistry via drugs such as antipsychotics or SSIRs, can significantly change one’s state of mind. These examples question whether the mind and body are two distinct entities; or, whether they are or are not, supports the belief that the two of them causally interact. These reflections also raise this metaphysical

Page 8

R a m s e y | A N O N T O L O G Y O F S H A P E S H I F T E R S | P a g e | 8 consideration: if the mind and body are a single entity, then are mental events explicable in terms of physical events, or vice versa? The causal relationship between mental states and physical states are strongly clear in shapeshifters. States of consciousness when beings of ‘Homo Exterior’ are in human form, may cause the mental state of sadness and so may manifest in the physical event of crying. Likewise, drugs such as antipsychotics or SSIRs significantly change shapeshifters state of mind while they are beings in human forms. However, it is the case that the mind is causally related to not only different physical states of the body, but it is also clear in shapeshifters that the mind is also causally related to different bodies as well as the physical states of those bodies. Thus, depending on the different transmutations their bodies undergo, mental states of consciousness such as the feeling of sadness may or may not manifest in the physical event of crying. That is because such mental and physical states typical to ‘Homo Sapiens’ might not be factors of any number of possible beings into which shapeshifters transmute. The idea of transmutation, however, seems to be a certain mental state of all beings of ‘Homo Exterior’ regardless of the kinds of bodies they have. The type of mind a shapeshifter has is causally related to the physical state, or more generally the type of beings of ‘Homo Exterior’ forms. In the question of whether the mind and body are a single entity among beings of ‘Homo Exterior’ certain mental states may be explicable by the physical states of their bodies; or, vice versa, the form or body of a shapeshifter may explain the mental states of every being of ‘Homo Exterior.’ However, the ability of beings of ‘Homo Exterior’ to shapeshift, is a necessary quality of either the mind or body of all

Page 9

R a m s e y | A N O N T O L O G Y O F S H A P E S H I F T E R S | P a g e | 9 shapeshifters. Such considerations fall under the banner of the mind-body problem as they relate to those metaphysical realities of ‘Homo Exterior.’ PLATO’S THEORY OF FORMS Plato’s theory suggests that the physical world is not as real or true as Ideas, translated from the Ancient Greek language into English as ‘Forms.’ Forms are timeless, absolute, and unchangeable. They are the non-physical essences of all things, of which objects and matter in the physical world are mere imitations. Through the character of Socrates in his dialogues, Plato sometimes suggests that these Forms are the only objects of study that can supply knowledge of a substance. Forms are the essences of objects, without which a thing would not be the kind of thing it is. For example, there are countless trees in the world, but the Form of tree-ness is at the core and is the essence of all of them. Horses, beauty, goodness, men, women, and even shapeshifters, have a form. The phenomena of these forms are mere shadows of a world of Forms which is transcendent to our world of substances and is the essential basis of reality. A Form is aspatial, which means it is transcendent to space. It has no spatial dimensions, nor location in space. It is non-physical, nor is it simply an idea in the mind. It is rather super-ordinate to matter, and extra-mental, and has been compared to a “blueprint of perfection.”4 A Form is also atemporal, in other words it is transcendent to time. Because a Form is atemporal it does not exist within any 4

Page 10

R a m s e y | A N O N T O L O G Y O F S H A P E S H I F T E R S | P a g e | 10 time-period, rather it supplies the formal basis of time. It is neither eternal, nor mortal. Although the Form of shapeshifting is timeless and unchanging, physical shapeshifters are in constant flux of existence. The Form of shapeshifting is unqualified excellence, yet beings who are shapeshifters are qualified and conditioned. The perfect Form of shapeshifting is a distinct singular thing which causes a plurality of shapeshifters, such as might very well be a multitude of substances in the world today. HYLOMORPHISM The Ancient Greek language originally had no word for matter, so Aristotle adapted the word hyle to explain that every physical object is made of the same basic substance, and every entity or being (ousia) is a compound of matter and immaterial form. Hyle (or wood, matter) correlates with the shape of a substance. Although there can be intellectual hyle, sensible hyle is composed of four elements – fire, water, air, and earth – which exist in a combination of hot, moist, dry, and cold, which are united to form everything. Matter is something out of which something is made. The matter of syllables is made from the matter of letters. Thus, hyle is a relative concept, and counts as compared to something else which is also hyle. A syllable is hyle in comparison to a word that is still hyle though in a relative way in that the matter of syllables make the matter of words. Sensible hyle involves the form (eidos) which our sense organs perceive the thing to be. Forms are involved with qualia such as colors, textures, tastes, smells, and sounds. A soul is the form of a living hyle, or that which makes a living thing alive. Aristotle says that a soul is related to its body as a form (morph) is related to matter. Moreover, the soul as the

Page 11

R a m s e y | A N O N T O L O G Y O F S H A P E S H I F T E R S | P a g e | 11 body’s substantial form enables personal identity to persist over time. Although a child’s body consists of different matter than does an adult’s body, it nevertheless shares a soul by which throughout a person’s life, that person’s body can be identified by the soul that forms that person. In subsequence, Aristotle says that a person’s body is no longer that person’s body after it dies. A shapeshifter is a living body or hylomorphic entity. Each individual shapeshifter is a substance, a combination of form and matter, and for Aristotle there is no form which is shapeshifter-ness. Rather, Aristotle’s views are more compatible with how modern science describes a living thing, viz., a combination of matter and energy. CONCLUSION Whereas it might be a soul, or mind, which describes the qualia of ‘Homo Exterior’ in terms of their existence as contingent beings, regardless the underlying substance of being, or Kant’s thing-in-itself as exemplified in the Stoic view of pneuma, or the invisible form of shapeshifting-ness of Plato’s theory of forms, enables the philosopher of being to begin to identify the substances of ‘Homo Exterior.’ The next chapter examines how several fundamental ontological concepts further describe the substances of shapeshifters.

IGGY THE DWARF THE ONTOLOGY OF H

Page 1

Page 2

Page 3